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            A principal goal of competition law is to promote fair distribution of wealth. Fair 
distribution of wealth is entrusted to competitive markets since they reward efficiency, 
innovation, spread wealth and decentralise economic power.  While competition reflects the 
business conduct of enterprises, it cannot disassociate from the legal and regulatory framework, 
barriers to entry and prevailing conditions in markets for labour, infrastructure services and other 
production inputs. Redistribution of wealth acknowledges competition law as a tool that can be 
utilised to protect those at the lower end of income distribution by reducing prices allowing a 
larger basket of goods and services to be purchased. 
Competition law is a tool that preserves market competition to provide an environment 
that encourages responsive business, efficiency and serves the interests of consumers. In 
developing countries, competition law and policy receive particular emphasis as being crucial 
and key in the economic and structural reform and addressing concerns of distribution and 
power. Competition law in Kenya cannot ignore the wider industrial policy or socio-economic 
considerations in Kenya. These social and political goals of competition law are important in 
developing countries with poverty, great income inequality. There is need to choose a means of 
addressing the equitable allocation of resources that will produce the least amount of inefficiency 
and competition law is the right tool to achieve this. 
Kenya is a factor-driven economy where the level of productivity is determined by 
labour, institutions, infrastructure and the macro-economic environment. Enacting the 
Competition Act in Kenya was a response to economic and political reform to improve the 
welfare, well-being and economy in Kenya. Merger analysis in Kenya would require weighing 
gains and losses in efficiency in order to establish whether the merger will benefit other 
recipients other than market participants such as consumers and producers.  
South Africa has well established interpretation and implementation addressing the trade-
off between public interest provisions and efficiency. Interpretation of the merger laws in South 
Africa illustrate engaging an exercise of proportionality required to determine how to balance the 
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The British colonial rule and occupation of Kenya were important in the design and 
development of the Kenyan economy.1 Kenya’s pre-independence economy went through three 
phases: first the ‘pre-colonial subsistence farming’, second the ‘consolidation of extraction of 
labour and penetration of settler farming’ and lastly the ‘establishment of indigenous 
entrepreneurs’.2 During British colonial rule, land was alienated to the British settler community 
creating a dominant agricultural production by settler farmers but severe land shortage to the 
African population.3 Agriculture became dominant and the rest of economy was secondary to it.4 
The link between the African population and the British settlers was relegated to the necessity 
for cheap labour from migrant workers previously accustomed to a ‘self-sufficient subsistence 
economy’.5  
Agriculture dominated the economy as a ‘substantially self-contained enclave with few 
linkages with the rest of the economy’ with little financial benefit and investment accruing to the 
country.6 Capital investment was provided by British banks while manufacturing supplies and 
implements were imported from the United Kingdom (UK) in addition to foreign proprietorship 
of the economy.7 Further, the African population were not consumers of the agricultural produce 
and there was only a small domestic market for manufactured goods and high priced food.8  
In 1963, Kenya gained independence from Great Britain. Post-independence, Kenya’s 
main economic challenge was the low degree of ‘industrialisation and monetisation’ since most 
consumer goods were previously imported from the UK by the settler community.9 A distinct 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) ‘Voluntary Peer Review on Competition 






7 Ibid at 4. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Competition Authority of Kenya ‘History of Competition Policy and Law Development in Kenya’ available at 





feature of the post-independence government was the preference for a diverse economy 
supporting the existing private sector created by the settler community with major industrial 
enterprises constituting the government sector.10 The Government of Kenya realised the need for 
achieving economic sovereignty, after political liberation, by embarking on state intervention.11 
State intervention was characterised by displacing foreign capital and workforce, price control, 
consumer subsidies and extending gained command of substantial resources that drove industrial 
growth and inclusive economic development.12 In order to satisfy domestic and the regional East 
African Community requirements, Kenya embarked on a rapid industrialisation and 
indigenisation of the economy by setting up import substitute industries.13  
However, by the mid-1970s, Kenya’s industrialisation programme suffered numerous 
challenges after the collapse of the East African Community and losing the East Africa market to 
imports from Asia.14 Kenyan industries now needed to cater for both the domestic market and the 
export market.15 Kenya responded by establishing market based incentives and regulatory 
structures that would direct private activity to areas of greatest benefit for all Kenyans.16 The 
government licensed more industries to boost domestic competition and exposed domestic firms 
to foreign competition by selectively allowing imports and progressively removing banned and 
price controlled items.17  
In 1988, Kenya enacted the Restrictive Trade Practices, Monopolies and Price Control 
Act (Restrictive Trade Practices Act) that sought to prohibit restrictive trade practices and 
establish an administrative mechanism to enforce the same.18 The Restrictive Trade Practices Act 
was intended as a transition legislation allowing Kenya to change from a price control to free 
enterprise economy.19 The Act was also intended to encourage competition by prohibiting 
restrictive trade practices, controlling monopolies, concentrations of economic power and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 UNCTAD op cit note 1 at 4. 
11 Ibid at 5. 
12 Ibid. Price control was administered under the Price Control Act of 1956 (repealed). 
13 Ibid.  
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid.  Sessional Paper No.1 of 1986 on ‘Economic Management for Renewed Growth’ encouraged the change 
from a controlled economy to a free economy. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Restrictive Trade Practices, Monopolies and Price Control Act (repealed) chapter 504 of the Laws of Kenya. 





prices.20 The Act further created the Monopolies and Prices Department of the Treasury which 
was controlled and managed by the Monopolies and Prices Commissioner.21 
The Restrictive Trade Practices Act was not effective in regulating a free market based 
economy mainly because it was intended as transitional and although encouraging a free market 
based economy it still contained provisions on price control. 22 The Act also had some notable 
gaps such as the absence provisions addressing abuse of dominance.23 Further, the Monopolies 
and Prices Commission, which was responsible for investigation of anti-competitive behavior, 
was subject to the control of the Minister of Finance.24 The Commission lacked authority and its 
role was advisory hence its reference as ‘all extent and purposes, a ministry’.25 
Kenya enacted the current Competition Act in 2011 in its efforts to realise economic 
development.26 The Competition Act has three major objectives: first it seeks to promote and 
safeguard competition in the national economy.27 Second, it has a consumer protection role 
which seeks to protect consumers from unfair and misleading market conduct.28 Lastly, it 
establishes the powers and functions of the Competition Authority and the Competition 
Tribunal.29 
1.2 Problem Statement 
With the advent of the Competition Act of Kenya, this paper first asks, what underlying 
principles would inform Kenya in implementing and interpreting the Competition Act? 
According to Fox, developing countries can either choose a ‘foundational perspective’ founded 
on liberalisation and free enterprise or one that centrally factors in the lack of transparency, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Preamble to the Restrictive Trade Practices, Monopolies and Price Control Act. 
21 Ibid s 3. 
22 S 35 of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act gave the Minister of Finance power to fix maximum prices for the sale 
of any goods. 
23 UNCTAD op cit note 1 at 61. 
24 S 3 (2) Restrictive Trade Practices Act. 
25 UNCTAD op cit note 1 at 61. Under section 30 of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act, the Commissioner 
evaluated applications for mergers for the purpose of formulating a recommendation to the Minister. 
26 Competition Act Number 12 of 2010 commenced on 1 August 2011. 







blockage and political control of markets, and empowers people economically to independently 
assist themselves.30 
Choosing a foundational perspective based on liberalisation and free enterprise is an 
easier way out being ‘a path well-travelled’ and offers clear simple rules with less intervention 
and discretion by officials.31 In this case, a developing country is motivated to adopt competition 
laws of other jurisdictions which have an established history of implementation and 
interpretation.32 Foundational perspective that takes into account of transparency, empowerment 
and political independence of markets are more complicated.33 This foundational perspective 
views competition policies for developing nations in a wider context by accounting for factors 
such as wealth distribution, weak competition institutions, barriers to trade and financial 
constraints.34  
Secondly, this study asks whether Kenya can balanced the trade-off between promoting 
long term production and dynamic efficiencies and wider social and political goals.35 There are 
two main views on the goals of competition law. The first is the ‘strict constructionist’ view 
where the legislature’s goal for enacting competition law is simply to increase economic 
efficiency.36 The second view is the ‘populist’ view, where legislature passes competition laws to 
further social and political goals.37 The support for pro-competition policies is attributed to its 
distributional consequences.38  
The strict constructionist view states that distributional issues are multi-dimensional, 
complex and are better addressed through other more suitable policy instruments such as 
taxation, labour law or institutional support for small businesses.39 Further, this view 
acknowledges that pursuing non-efficiency objectives can prove counterproductive since in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Eleanor M Fox ‘Economic Development, Poverty, and Antitrust: The Other Path’ (2007) 13 Southwestern Journal 
of Law and Trade in the Americas 101 at 103.  
31 Ibid at 104. 
32 Michal S Gal & Eleanor M Fox ‘Drafting competition law for developing jurisdictions: learning from experience’ 
(2014) New York University Law and Economics Working Papers paper 374 at 5. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Gal & Fox op cit note 32 at 56. 
36 Robert H Lande ‘Proving the Obvious: The Antitrust Laws Were Passed to Protect Consumers (Not Just to 
Increase Efficiency)’ [1999] 50 Hastings Law Journal 959 at 961. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Richard S Markovits ‘An Ideal Antitrust Law Regime’ (1985) 64 Texas Law Review 251 at 267. 





long term, market power efficiency standard is more likely to lead to positive results in non-
efficiency objectives of competition law.40  
Proponents of the populist view advocate that competition policy should not be assigned 
a myopic view lacking a broader social and political objective.41 Instead the purely economic 
goals of competition law as properly defined should embrace most requirements of a progressive 
competition policy being the ‘unity between the pragmatic substance of [competition] which is 
its economic goals and the law's animating spirit-its social and political foundations’.42 Therefore 
the pursuit of the properly defined economic goals of competition law will also advance the 
social and political goals of the law.43  
 
Income distribution occurs when there is a shift in either consumer surplus or producer 
surplus.44 Equity objectives are ‘value judgements’ political in nature making them more 
uncertain than efficiency objectives.45 When government intervenes directly to reallocate 
resources through equity objectives in its efforts to improve income distribution it can create 
unintended inefficiencies.46 This issue raises a ‘trade-off’ between social and political goals of 
competition law and efficiency.47 Intervention by the government ‘has the potential to change 
incentives for firms’ that ‘distort choices and sacrifice efficiency’.48 Conditions imposed because 
of public interest objectives raise costs to efficiency, economic welfare and income distribution 
both within and beyond the related markets.49 There is need to offset efficiency benefits against 
costs associated with potential for government intervening in mergers through the public interest 
considerations.50  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Paul S Crampton ‘Alternative Approaches to Competition Law Consumers’ Surplus, Total Surplus, Total Welfare 
and Non-Efficiency Goals’ (1993) 17 World Competition at 85. 
41 Joseph F Brodley ‘The Economic Goals Of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, And Technological 
Progress’ [1987] 62 New York University Law Review 1020 at 1021. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Willem Boshoff, Daryl Dingley
 
& Janine Dingley ‘The Economics Of Public Interest Provisions In South African 
Competition Policy’ available at http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/The-economics-of-public-
interest-provisions-in-South-African-competition-policy.pdf accessed on 31 August 2015 at 14. 
45 Ibid. 









‘Equity objectives are important in a society which has such great income inequality’ 
therefore there is need to ‘choose a means of addressing the equitable allocation of resources that 
will produce the least amount of inefficiency’.51 According to Hanke, ‘intervention and control 
of the economy by governments is as old as the existence of human beings [while] the concept of 
public interest is as old as the political philosophy of government intervention’.52  
1.3 Overview of merger considerations. 
1.3.1 Kenya 
In determining a proposed merger53 the Competition Authority of Kenya applies the 
standard test on the likelihood of the proposed merger to prevent, lessen competition or restricts 
trade and result in any undertaking acquiring or strengthening a dominant position in a market.54 
However, there are additional factors the Authority must consider, these are: 
i) the extent to which the proposed merger would be likely affect a particular industrial 
sector or region; 
ii) employment; 
iii) ability of small undertakings to gain access or be competitive in any market; 
iv) ability of national industries to compete in international markets.55  
 
These social and political goals in merger review are borrowed from the public interest 
considerations under section 12A of the Competition Act of South Africa.56 The public interest 
considerations in reviewing proposed mergers under the Competition Act of South Africa are: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Boshoff et al op cit note 44 at 22. 
52 Michael Hantke-Domas ‘The Public Interest Theory of Regulation: Non-Existence or Misinterpretation?’ 
(2003) 15 European Journal of Law and Economics 165 at 166. 
53 S 2 of the Competition Act defines mergers as ‘an acquisition of shares, business or other assets, whether inside or 
outside Kenya, resulting in the change of control of a business, part of a business or an asset of a business in Kenya 
in any manner and includes a takeover’. 
54 S 46 (2) (a) and (b) of the Competition Act of Kenya. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) Model Law on Competition United Nations New York and Geneva 2010 available at 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/tdrbpconf7d8_en.pdf accessed on 14 June 2015 ch VI p II. The Model Law proposes the 
prohibition of mergers, takeovers, joint ventures or other acquisitions of control, including interlocking 
directorships, whether of a horizontal, vertical or conglomerate nature that substantially increases the ability to 
exercise market power above competitive levels the resultant market share will result in a dominant firm or in a 
significant reduction of competition in a market dominated by very few firm. 
55 S 46 (2) (d) to (g Competition Act of Kenya). 





‘ i) a particular industrial sector or region; 
ii)  employment; 
iii) the ability of small businesses, or firms controlled or owned by historically   
disadvantaged persons, to become competitive; and 
iv) the ability of national industries to compete in international markets.’57 
 
1.3.2 South Africa 
 
South Africa’s public interest considerations are peculiar since they depart from the 
standard economic evaluation of likelihood to substantially prevent or lessen competition or 
acquiring or strengthening a dominant position in a market. These public interest considerations 
were informed by the need to create a competitive and efficient economy that allowed access and 
participation of the historically disadvantaged population.58At the end of Apartheid and the 
inception of a democratic South Africa under the African National Congress (ANC) government, 
there were calls to privatise the economy as a solution to the centralised state controlled 
economy.59 However, the ANC changed its approach to privatisation and advocated for a 
stronger competition law upon realisation that privatisation may lead to assets landing in control 
of the white minority.60  
The government sought to develop a competition policy that would derive both the 
benefits of the competition policy and broader government development policies.61 The 
government believed that competition and development were not contradictory objectives but 
mutually supportive if properly aligned.62 Alignment would be achieved through synchronising 
varying domestic and international development tools by aligning both industrial and trade 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Ibid s 12 A (3). 
58 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) ‘Competition Law and Policy in South 
Africa: An OECD Peer Review’ OECD Global Forum on Competition Peer Review: Paris, 11 February 2003 
available at http://www.oecd.org/competition/globalforum/GlobalForum-February2003.pdf accessed on 14 
November 2014 at 16. 
59 Ibid at 11. 
60 Ibid. 
61 James Hodge, Sha’ista Goga & Tshepiso Moahloli ‘Public-interest provisions in the South African Competition 
Act: A critical review’ Competition Policy, Law and Economics Conference 2009 available at 
http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Public-Interest-Provisions14-August-2009-2.docx accessed 






policy and competition law with government policies that sought to redress the legacy of racial 
distortions.63 
2. METHODOLOGY 
This dissertation uses a comparative study of the merger laws in South Africa and Kenya. 
The scope of the comparative analysis includes analysis and interpretation of the Competition 
Acts, judicial decisions and guidelines from Kenya and South Africa.  
The aim of the comparative analysis is to identify strengths and challenges of merger 
analysis under the Competition Act of Kenya and to make recommendations for guidance and 
reform.  
2.1 Need for this study 
Developing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are undergoing structural and economic 
reform. These reforms include the enactment of competition laws. Developing countries either 
resort to enacting laws based on their social, economic and political characteristics or 
transplanting established laws from other jurisdictions. Although the benefit and limitations of 
developing countries using transplants from developed countries has been widely explored, there 
is a chasm on transplants from fellow developing countries specifically with income 
distributional goals.  Further, although there are several well established model competition laws 
from years of research and development, there is need to inquire whether these model laws fit 
into the context of developing countries.  
The link between competition laws and developing countries is an area that has been 
explored by some scholars. The study of competition laws and developing countries has been 
carried out by generally analysing developing countries. Such generalisation looks beyond the 
geographical location and emphasises on common economic characteristics of developing 
countries. This study will explore the use the interpretation of efficiencies and public interest 
provisions in South Africa in order to develop a better understanding on how the Competition 
Authority of Kenya can balance between the benefits of efficiencies and social and political 
goals in merger review. 






2.2 Objective of the study 
The objective of this study is to analyse the efficiency and public interest provisions 
under the Competition Act of Kenya, to identify weaknesses, comment on proposed reforms and 
make recommendations that will be used as a guidance and tool for reform. 
2.3 Limitations of the study 
This study analyses merger considerations in competition law and not competition policy. 
Competition policy encompasses the wider government measures that influence the degree of 
competition in a country’s market including trade policies and privatisation programmes.64 
Although there are a number of references to competition policy, this study will be directed at 
the narrower scope of competition law. It will be beyond the capacity and scope of this study to 
address efficiencies, social and political goals of competition policy. 
Although the Competition Authority of Kenya is inchoate, it determined on a small 
number of mergers since its formation. However, these cases are neither reported nor accessible 
for purposes of analysis. This study will rely on guidelines issued by the Competition Authority 
of Kenya on mergers.  
2.4 Overview of Chapters 
This study will consist of four chapters. Chapter one has introduced a background into 
the development of the Kenyan economy and legislation on competition law. This chapter has 
discussed the foundational perspectives considered by developing countries when enacting 
competition law and balancing the trade-off between promoting efficiencies and distributional 
goals of competition law. Lastly, this chapter has outlined the research questions, the scope of 
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the dissertation and the need for this study justifying this comparative study between Kenya and 
South Africa, 
Chapter two discusses the recent economic, social and political reform policies that led to 
the reform and enactment of the Competition Act of Kenya. Further, this chapter analyses the 
economic, social and institutional characteristics and challenges in Kenya and their effect on the 
factors of production, level of productivity and conducting business in Kenya. Lastly, this 
chapter will look at the effect of these characteristics on merger law.  
Chapter three discusses income distribution goals of mergers through analysing 
efficiencies and public interest provisions of merger law in South Africa and Kenya. This chapter 
will briefly reviews literature on the role of efficiencies in promoting resource allocation. It also 
analyses the types of efficiencies and the different welfare standards applied in merger review. 
Thereafter, this chapter will discuss efficiencies, public interest inquiry and conditions as tools 
for preserving benefits of mergers in anti-competitive mergers under both Kenya and South 
Africa.  
Chapter four will conclude this study and offer recommendations on reform of the 














CHAPTER 2: ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF 




Competition is defined as the rivalry between commercial enterprises which respond to 
consumer demand through innovative processes and products that lower prices and increase 
quality.65 While competition reflects the business conduct of enterprises, it cannot disassociate 
from the ‘legal and regulatory framework, barriers to entry and exit, and prevailing conditions in 
markets for labour, land, finance, infrastructure services, and other productive inputs’.66  
The purpose of this part of the thesis is twofold: first, to illustrate that the enactment of 
the Competition Act in Kenya was a response to economic and political reform to improve the 
welfare, well-being and economy in Kenya. Secondly, to discuss the economic, social and 
institutional conditions that affect the factors of production, level of productivity and conducting 
business in Kenya. 
Competition law is a tool that preserves market competition to provide an environment 
that encourages responsive business, efficiency and serves the interests of consumers.67 The 
foundations of competition law are traced to developed countries. In developed countries, 
competition law is an efficiency instrument focusing on the aggregate consumer or total wealth 
and is ‘applied with the assumption that markets increase aggregate wealth’.68 In developing 
countries, competition law and policy receive particular emphasis as being crucial and key in the 
economic and structural reform.69 In developing countries, competition law addresses ‘concerns 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Mark Dutz & R Shyaman Khemani ‘Competition Law and Policy Challenges in South Asia’ (2007) World Bank 
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wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2008/09/22/000333037_20080922013058/Rende
red/PDF/452810WP0Box334059B01PUBLIC1.pdf accessed on 21 June 2015 foreword. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Eleanor M Fox ‘Equality Discrimination, and Competition Law: Lessons from and for South Africa and 
Indonesia’ (2000) 41 Harvard International Law Journal 579. 
68 Fox op cit note 30 at 110. 
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of distribution and power’.70 This chapter is premised on the argument that competition law in 
Kenya cannot ignore the wider industrial policy or socio-economic considerations in Kenya. 
This chapter is concerned with the business environment which firms operate in Kenya. 
The first part will look at the recent economic, social and political reform policies in Kenya that 
led to the reform and enactment of the Competition Act. The second part will look at the 
economic, social and institutional characteristics and challenges of Kenya. The third part will 
look at the effect of these characteristics on merger laws. 
2.  RECENT ECONOMIC REFORM INITIATIVES IN KENYA 
2.1 Economic Recovery Strategy 2003-2007 
In 2002, the Kenyan economy was confronted by low economic growth, high 
unemployment rate and a large percentage of the population living in poverty.71 To ameliorate 
these challenges, the Kenyan government initiated a five year Economic Recovery Strategy for 
Wealth and Employment Creation (ERS) plan.72 This plan focused on four pillars: first, 
strengthening macro-economic stability by improving revenue collection, restructuring 
expenditure and adopting a monetary policy that supported economic growth.73 Secondly, 
strengthen and improve governing institutions by reforming public administration.74 Thirdly, 
rehabilitate and expand physical infrastructure to reduce the cost of production of goods and 
encourage competitiveness of locally produced goods.75 Lastly, access and exploit the human 
capital of the poor to create a well-educated and healthy population that will enhance 
productivity and overall performance of the economy.76 
Most notably, the ERS emphasised the need to competition law reforms.77 The ERS 
recommended addressing challenges undermining the effectiveness of the Restrictive Trade 
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Creation 2003 – 2007 available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/KENYAEXTN/Resources/ERS.pdf accessed on 
21 June 2015 at ix. 
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Practices Act and the lack of harmony between sector regulatory laws and competition law. 78 
Further, the ERS recommended enhancing the autonomy of the competition authority and 
allocating adequate finances to build the human resource capacity of the competition authority.79 
According to the ERS ‘the formulation and implementation of the competition law will take 
cognizance of the special regional and preferential interests of the country’.80 
At the end of its term, the ERS was quite a success. Kenya benefitted from an economic 
growth of more than 6 per cent in 2007 from 0.6 per cent in 2002 and a reduction of poverty 
from 56 per cent in 2002 to 46 per cent in 2006.81 However, the current Competition Act was not 
enacted during this term. 
2.2 Kenya Vision 2030 
At the end of the ERS term in 2007, Kenya embarked on a 25 year long term plan known 
as Kenya Vision 2030.82 Vision 2030 sought to create ‘a globally competitive and prosperous 
country with a high quality of life by 2030’ by transforming Kenya into ‘a newly-industrialised, 
middle-income country providing a high quality of life to all its citizens in a clean and secure 
environment’.83 Vision 2030 is anchored on economic, social and political governance pillars.84 
The economic pillar aims to ‘achieve an average economic growth rate of 10 per cent per annum 
and sustaining the same till 2030 in order to generate more resources to meet the Millennium 
Development Goals’.85 The social pillar seeks to ‘create a just, cohesive and equitable social 
development in a clean and secure environment’.86 The political pillar aims to ‘realise an issue-
based, people-centered, result-oriented and accountable democratic system’.87  
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80 Ibid. 
81 Office of the Prime Minister Ministry of State for Planning, National Development and Vision 2030 ‘Sessional 
paper No. 10 of 2012 on Kenya Vision 2030’ available at 
http://www.foresightfordevelopment.org/sobipro/download-file/46-1263/54 accessed on 17 June 2015 at ii.  
82 Ibid.  
83 Ibid at ii. 
84 Ibid at ii, iii & iv. 
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The Vision 2030 pillars are anchored on first, economic objectives that strengthen the 
foundations of macroeconomic stability.88 Secondly, institutional objectives of the Vision 2030 
include continuing governance reforms, human resources development and public sector reforms 
that will create efficient, motivated and well-trained public service.89 Thirdly, infrastructural 
objectives include improving infrastructure, generating more energy and increasing efficiency in 
energy consumption and using science, technology and innovation to raise productivity and 
efficiency levels.90 Fourthly, the social objectives of Vision 2030 include enhanced equity and 
wealth creation opportunities for the poor and creating secure living and working environment.91 
 
It was during the Vision 2030 that the review of the previous competition laws was fast-
tracked and the current Competition Act was enacted.92 
 
3. ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF KENYA 
3.1 Economic Characteristics 
3.1.1 Economies	  Generally	  	  
Economies in the world are generally divided into three main categories: ‘factor-driven, 
efficiency-driven and innovation-driven’.93 A factor-driven economy is the first stage of 
economic development and its salient feature is based on its ‘factor’ endowments which include 
unskilled labour and natural resources.94 The level of productivity for factor-driven economies is 
determined by ‘a healthy and literate workforce, well-functioning public and private institutions, 
well-developed infrastructure and a stable macro-economic environment’.95 Kenya is classified 
as a factor-driven economy.96  
The second stage of economic development is the efficiency-driven economies where 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




92 Competition Authority of Kenya ‘Annual Report 2012/13’ available at 
http://www.cak.go.ke/index.php?option=com_docman&view=docman&Itemid=530 accessed on 29 January 2015 at 
8. 
93 World Economic Forum ‘The Africa Competitiveness Report 2013’ World Bank available at 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Africa_Competitiveness_Report_2013.pdf accessed on 15 June 2015. 







countries develop efficient production processes that increase product quality.97 The level of 
productivity is determined by ‘higher education and training, efficient goods and services 
market, frictionless labour markets, developed financial markets, the ability to make use of latest 
technological developments and the size of the domestic and foreign markets available to the 
country’s companies’.98 South Africa is an efficiency-driven economy.99 
The last stage of development is the innovation-driven stage characterised by high wages 
and high standards of living where the level of productivity is determined by competing in 
‘producing new and different goods using the most sophisticated production and business 
processes and innovation’. 100 Innovation-driven economies include Germany, United Kingdom, 
and United States.101 
The rationale behind the classification of economies is to illustrate the different factors 
that determine the level of productivity and competition in different economies in the world.102  
3.1.2 The	  Kenyan	  Economy	  	  
There are two main economic indicators. First, the Gross National Income per capita 
(GNI) threshold is an ‘indicator of economic capacity and progress’ which measures the 
relationship between well-being such as poverty and economic variables. 103 Secondly, the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) which gauges the total gross value of goods and services produced 
locally in an economy within a specific period of time.104  
GNI is preferred in assessing a country’s competitiveness. Although GNI ‘does not 
completely summarise a country’s level of development or measure welfare it has proved to be a 
useful and easily available indicator that is closely correlated with other non-monetary measures 
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such as the quality of life’.105 GNI relates to consumer’s purchasing capability and in extension 
the potential of competition. 106 Further, levels of GNI may be influenced by resultant increased 
productivity, efficiency and enhanced innovation.107 Conversely, low levels of GNI may indicate 
low levels of competition.108 The limitation to using GNI is that it may undervalue low income 
economies which have many informal and subsistence sectors.109 According to the World Bank, 
countries are classified into low, low-middle, upper-middle and high income based on their level 
of GNI per capita.110 The low and middle income countries are collectively referred to as 
developing countries.111  
As at 2014, Kenya had a GNI per capita of US$ 1 280 while its GDP was US$60.94 
billion.112 Kenya is classified as a low-middle income economy.113 Kenya’s GDP has projected a 
rise from 5.4 per cent in 2014 to between 6 and 7 per cent from 2015 to 2017 making it ‘one of 
the fastest-growing economies in Sub-Saharan Africa’ and the ninth biggest economy in 
Africa.114 The main sectors that drive the Kenyan economy are agriculture, manufacturing, 
wholesale and retail trade.115 
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3.1.2.1 Agriculture  
Agriculture is the ‘mainstay of the Kenyan economy’ and contributes about 27 per cent of 
the share of the GDP.116 More than one-third of the produce from agriculture is exported and 
accounts for more than 65 per cent of the total exports from Kenya.117  
3.1.2.2 Manufacturing  
The manufacturing sector contributes approximately 10 per cent to Kenya’s GDP.118 The 
manufacturing sector in Kenya is ‘fragmented’ and constitutes a number of broad sub-sectors led 
by food processing, beverages and tobacco, refined petroleum products and textiles, apparel, 
leather and footwear.119 Majority of these manufactured goods are basic products as opposed to 
skill-intensive products such as pharmaceuticals.120 Most manufacturing firms in Kenya are 
family owned and operated.121 
3.1.2.3 Wholesale and Retail Trade  
Although the trade sector contributes an estimated 10 per cent to Kenya’s economy and is 
described as a key sector in the economy of Kenya being ‘the link between production and 
consumption’.122 Once streamlined, the trade sector has ‘the potential to lower the cost to 
consumers and to intermediate producers’.123 This sector is predominantly informal, 
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3.1.3 Economic Challenges 
3.1.3.1 Barriers to trade  
Barriers to trade undermine the potential of competition by distorting the trading system 
by creating an unfair trading environment that does not support businesses in accessing 
markets.125 The wholesale and retail trade sector faces challenges of multiple license 
requirements and failure to access external markets.126 The manufacturing sector also faces a 
number of barriers to trade such as high input costs, expensive and poor quality raw materials, 
rising labour costs, unreliable and expensive energy costs.127 Agricultural sector faces poor 
access to credit, high costs of inputs such as fertilizer and seeds.128 Further, there is decline in 
productivity in the agricultural sector due to high cost of inputs and taxation through municipal 
levies, poor livestock husbandry, limited extension services, over-reliance on rain fed 
agriculture, absence of markets and limited use of technology and innovation.129  
Kenya’s tax revenue to GDP ratio is currently at 20 per cent which is relatively high 
compared to other developing countries and in the East African region.130 However, Kenya’s tax 
regime remains complex and cumbersome with uneven and unfair taxes, low compliance, narrow 
tax base with very high rates and rates dispersions with respect to trade.131  
Barriers to trade in Kenya create unfavourable environment for conducting business and 
high business costs.132 The manufacturing sector heavy regulation has led to complex and 
overlapping business and investment registration.133 Further, weak negotiations on international 
and regional trade agreements impede the ability of Kenyan firms to compete internationally.134 
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Weak enforcement standards and tax laws have resulted in dumping of low quality imports and 
counterfeit goods into the local market impeding competition.135 
3.1.3.2 Inflation 
Inflation is the annual percentage change in the Consumer Price Index which is defined 
as the ‘measure of the weighted aggregate change in retail prices paid by consumers for a given 
basket of goods and services’.136 Kenyan’s economy is susceptible to inflation due to increase in 
the cost of several food and non-food items outweighing the cost of energy products such as 
electricity and petroleum.137 Inflation influences the volatility and inconsistency in the pricing of 
goods and services.  
3.1.3.3 State Participation in Commercial Activities 
 
The Government of Kenya participates in various commercial activities ranging from 
utility services such as oil refineries, electric power generating companies to commercial 
enterprises such as banks and hotels. 138 The challenges emerging from state participation are 
mainly the overlapping jurisdiction of sector regulation, high demand for public resources to 
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The wholesale and retail trade sector in Kenya is pre-dominantly informal.140 The 
informal sector is the source of income for those who fail to access formal employment and is 
dominated by trade in perishable agricultural goods.141 The informal sector is driven by supply 
chain challenges in the formal sector and high demand for goods due to lower prices compared to 
the formal sector. 142 The supply chains from producers to distributor and consumers are ‘highly 
fragmented and involve millions of small producers and arbitrage traders’ resulting in an 
unpredictable delivery of output by producers.143  
Informality results in a number of challenges to the government such as low tax revenue 
due to failure to pay income taxes and difficulty in collecting taxes from the large number of 
informal traders.144 Further, informality has the potential of distorting markets when analysing 
labour employment and produce marketing data.145 
3.1.3.5 Lack of Competition Culture  
In developing countries, there is a notable lack of sufficient awareness on the economics 
of competition.146 Competition in developing countries may not be compatible with the prevalent 
business culture.147 In assuming levels of risk in the market, jurisdictions accustomed to planning 
and control from intense governmental involvement in the economy might be reluctant to rely on 
market dynamics by random private enterprises.148 
In its Annual Report for the year 2013/2014, the Competition Authority of Kenya cited 
the lack of a competition culture in Kenya as one its main challenges.149 According to the 
Authority, the lack of a competition culture has contributed to distortions in some markets such 
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as professional agencies.150 These distortions were aggravated by support through legislation 
which is enforced by government agencies.151 
3.2 Institutional Characteristics and Challenges 
Institutions determine the ‘legal and administrative framework within which individuals, 
firms, and governments interact to generate wealth’.152 Kenya faces the challenge of poor 
governance resulting in institutional failure in leading sectors. Agricultural institutions lack a 
comprehensive legal framework to guide formulation of consistent policies and also face poor 
governance in the cooperative associations.153 Further, institutional failure is caused by lack 
capacity by the private sector to take over previous government functions after trade 
liberalisation programmes.154  
Under the global competitiveness report, the main challenge in doing business in Kenya 
was corruption.155 The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) measuring ‘the perceived levels of 
public sector corruption worldwide’.156 Kenya ranks highly at position 145 out of 175 countries 
in being the least corrupt.157 Corruption is attributed to poor management in the public sector, 
excessive discretion in government, appointments of incompetent public officials, political 
interference and lack of professionalism in public administration.158  
The notable institutional challenges faced by the Competition Authority of Kenya are the 
inability to satisfy the demand for skills development for existing staff, budgetary constraints and 
undeveloped systems to manage financial and human resources.159 
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3.3 Social Characteristics and Challenges 
3.3.1 Poverty 
Poverty is defined as ‘lack of income and productive resources sufficient to ensure 
sustainable livelihoods; hunger and malnutrition; ill health; limited or lack of access to education 
and other basic services; increased morbidity and mortality from illness; homelessness and 
inadequate housing; unsafe environments; and social discrimination and exclusion’.160 Poverty 
has two main elements: the lack of income and inaccessibility to social services.161  
According to the United Nations, poverty is ‘intensified by unemployment, labour market 
inequalities, an unequal distribution of power, and by limits on political participation’.162 Poverty 
in Kenya is quite high and estimated between 34 and 42 per cent of the population lives in 
poverty.163  
3.3.2 Labour and the Youth 
The informal sector holds the largest share of employment at 82.7 per cent of the total 
employment rate.164 Although labour is a major contributor to output growth, labour in Kenya 
faces two main challenges: high unemployment rate and low productivity.165 Kenya faces a high 
unemployment rate estimated at 12.7 per cent.166 Labour in Kenya also faces low productivity as 
a result of poor education and skill levels.167  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 Hassan Qaqaya & George Lipimile (Eds) ‘The Effects of Anti-Competitive Business Practices on Developing 
Countries and their Development Prospects’ United Nations Conference On Trade And Development available at 
http://unctad.org/en/docs/ditcclp20082_en.pdf  accessed on 14 September 2015 at 210-11.   
161 Ibid. 
162 Ibid at 212. 
163 The World Bank ‘Kenya Overview’ available at http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/kenya/overview accessed 
on 19 June 2015.  
164 Economic Survey Report op cit note 115 at 34. According to United Nations Development Programme ‘Kenya’s 
Youth Employment Challenge’ available at 
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Poverty%20Reduction/Inclusive%20development/Kenya_YEC_web(
jan13).pdf accessed on 28 August 2015 at 12,  a formal job is defined as having ‘a larger probability of providing 
full-time, year-round employment and better earnings than an informal or traditional job.’ In some instances, a 
formal job ‘might also provide employment benefits such as health care and paid holidays, which is not the case 
with informal jobs’. 
165 ERS op cit note 71 at 33. 
166 UNDP op cit note 164 at 5. Unemployment rate is calculated by linking the number of unemployed people to the 
economically active population within the pool of those employed. 





The youth are disadvantaged and have weak connection to employment as compared to 
the general population.168 The youth who constitute approximately 38 per cent of the population 
of Kenya between 15 and 35 years are regarded as the age where ‘much of the human capital is 
formed’.169  However, the rate of unemployment for the youth is very high and the youth form 80 
per cent of the unemployed.170 Youth unemployment in Kenya is caused by ‘slow or declining 
economic growth, rapid population growth, poor dissemination of labour market information, 
skills mismatch, structural reforms, and high costs of labour’.171 The youth in Kenya have a 
higher dependency rate due to the high rate of unemployment, limited skills and lack of 
resources and opportunities.172 
3.3.3 Inequality 
Low agricultural productivity, poor governance, ethnicity and dependence in economic 
growth based on ‘capital-intensive’ sector including commodity trade drive inequality in 
Africa.173 Inequality here refers to ‘horizontal inequality’ characterised by exclusion of certain 
groups from actively participating in society both socially and economically.174 An illustration of 
the effect of inequality is access to capital. The poverty-struck population has no access to 
security and eventually credit creating insecurity over property rights leading to social and 
political conflicts and undermining investment.175 
Under the income Gini coefficient which measures ‘the deviation of the distribution of 
income among individuals or households within a country from a perfectly equal distribution’ 
where a value of 0 represents absolute equality, a value of 100 absolute inequality Kenya scores 
47 where the global average is approximately 40.176 Kenya has a high level of inequality from 
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the large and poor population who are less educated, skilled and unable to access social services 
and employment opportunities.177 
4. EFFECTS OF CHARACTERISTICS ON MERGER POLICIES 
In designing ideal merger laws, a jurisdiction must balance between ‘push and pull of 
optimal merger design’.178 The push factor is the motivation to transplant the merger laws from 
another jurisdiction regardless of any similarities with the followed jurisdiction.179 The main 
impetus for push factors are mainly the success of the merger laws in the followed jurisdiction, 
liberalisation of international trade as a response from globalisation and international cooperation 
or as a condition for financial aid or regional trade agreements.180 Pull factors occur when a 
jurisdiction designs its merger laws based on its distinct characteristics including socio-economic 
and enforcement conditions.181 Pull factors consider the level of economic analysis, legal and 
practical tools in collecting information and the legal weight of experts in the decision making 
process and in extension the political effects of such decisions.182    
Designing an ideal merger law necessitates balancing the competing push and pull 
factors.183 This paper will delve into the pull factors considered in designing merger law by 
analysing the preceding characteristics of Kenya on designing merger laws. 
4.1 Simplicity 
Human and financial resource constraints coupled with a low level of economic 
sophistication from market participants can primarily influence merger laws in two ways.184 
First, merger laws should be fairly simple to apply.185 Simplicity is achieved through adopting 
clear legal presumptions with respect to the economic effects of mergers.186 This will benefit 
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technically deficient competition authorities by clarifying and predicting decision making.187 
Such legal presumptions affect the level of complexity of the law, burden of proof, level of 
transparency and even the number of prohibitions to be applied.188 
Generally mergers can be reviewed before execution (‘ex ante’) or investigated 
subsequently after taking place (‘post ante’).189 Merger laws may be simplified through 
application of ex ante review.190 Ex ante merger review is beneficial to markets with participants 
with a low level of sophistication since there is no obligation on the merging parties to solely 
carry out the analysis.191  
4.2 Merger Notifications 
 
Kenya faces the challenge of lacking adequate human and financial resources in 
competition analysis.192 Competition agencies try to achieve ‘optimal deterrence’ which ‘entails 
prohibiting anti-competitive conduct and allowing neutral or pro-competitive conduct’.193 
Human and financial resource constraints can lead to erroneous decisions in achieving optimal 
deterrence.194 Such errors can be either ‘false negatives’ where the narrow application of 
regulations fail to capture anti-competitive conduct or ‘false positives’ where the wide 
application of regulations prohibits pro-competitive conduct.195 These errors are due to the 
inability of the competition authority to use information correctly and misapplication of rules due 
to the inability to perform economic and legal analysis despite having access to information.196  
Merger review based on ex ante notification can be resource consuming since the 
authority must review all mergers meeting the threshold.197 This creates extensive burden on 
other areas of enforcement assuming the authority has one pool of enforcement resources for its 
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other activities.198 Therefore, competition authorities in developing countries need to create a 
more efficient enforcement system by limiting the scope of merger review. 199  
Limiting merger review is achieved through: first, placing a minimum threshold to ensure 
mergers with insignificant economic effects are not reviewed.200 Secondly, mandatory merger 
notifications can be abolished but allow the authority to break down a merger if it subsequently 
proves anti-competitive.201 Thirdly, a voluntary system of notification can be adopted where a 
competition authority has the power to investigate and apply remedies on anti-competitive 
mergers post-merger.202 Lastly, merger review can be subject to notifications from mergers 
falling within a ‘corridor’ between a minimum and maximum threshold.203 The maximum 
threshold in a ‘corridor’ restricts reviewing mergers of a certain threshold involving international 
and foreign companies with such excessive turnovers that would seldom be dropped merely by 
not clearing with the developing country’s competition authority.204  
4.3 	  	  	  	  Transparency and discretion 
 
Corruption is prevalent where there are low levels of transparency and wide discretion on 
individual decision makers. 205 Merger laws should set clear parameters that limit discretion and 
ensure transparency allowing third parties to establish how decisions are made. 206 Further, in 
order to avoid corruption, merger review should be determined by a ‘college of decision makers’ 
rather than an individual.207 Noting the high rate of corruption and the role of courts in 
propagating it, it is advisable for new competition tribunals to appoint new judges in place of 
using existing court system.208 
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4.4  ‘Weight of wider industrial policy or socio-economic considerations’209 
 
Industrial policy or socio-economic considerations in mergers are wider factors not 
related to competition that are beyond merging parties or markets and usually entail trade-offs.210 
These considerations include employment, financial stability, ‘protection of national champions’ 
and ‘increasing the ownership status of historically disadvantaged persons’.211 
In developing jurisdictions ‘the goal of promoting long-term production and dynamic 
efficiency should be centre stage, even at the cost of some harm to allocate efficiency in the short 
term’.212 In order to promote long-term production, competition law may require combining 
competition and cooperation in addition to maximising competition concerns.213 Cooperation 
involves government support for rationalised and efficient production where markets are not 
sophisticated.214  
Competition law can be a tool for incorporating long-term inclusive growth as an 
‘important promise of the market system’.215 Competition law allows access to social services 
previously in the control of the state and ensures fair market play which encourages trade, 
generates employment and reduces inequalities.216 
CONCLUSION 
The Kenyan economy is a factor driven economy characterised by high barriers to trade, 
predominant informality and state participation. The low economic growth is related to low 
productivity and a high unemployment rate from labour which is a major contributor to output 
growth. Low productivity is attributed to poor education and skill levels while unemployment on 
the other hand is attributed to a growing population amidst slow economic growth and high costs 
of labour. Poor education and skill level are linked to poverty which denies the access social 
services and employment opportunities. Whichever way you look at it, these cross-cutting issues 
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illustrate how economic growth is proportional to social welfare and wellbeing. These cross-
cutting issues influence the design of the merger laws specific to the Kenya’s challenges. This 
design can incorporate the institutional challenges by countries to enable an accurate and cost 
efficient review of mergers.  
Competition law is imperative in the economic and structural reform in Kenya and must 
take into account these wider socio-economic issues in Kenya in order to regulate mergers under 





















CHAPTER 3: REDISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH THROUGH MERGERS: COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF EFFICIENCY AND NON-EFFICIENCY PUBLIC INTEREST PROVISIONS 
IN THE COMPETITION LAWS OF KENYA AND SOUTH AFRICA  
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
This section of the thesis examines wealth redistribution through efficiency and public 
interest provisions of merger law in South Africa and Kenya. The preceding part illustrated 
Kenya’s social, economic and institutional challenges and their influence on developing the 
Competition Act of Kenya.  
 
According to Sutherland and Kemp: 
 
‘Although it is never stated that the main goals of competition law is to promote a fair 
distribution of wealth, one of the major reasons why the economy is left to competitive markets 
is because it is accepted that they distribute wealth fairly. Markets that operate properly reward 
efficiency and innovation, spread wealth and decentralize economic power. However this will 
not always be the case in unequal societies or developing economies.’217 
 
This part will engage with the interpretation of both the efficiency and social and political 
goals of competition law that: first, competition authorities in Kenya will have to accommodate 
considerations beyond the economics of competition.218 Secondly, the legislature was correct to 
envisage competition as an effective tool to achieving social and political goals. However this 
benefit is not likely to occur in all instances therefore creating a necessity for public interest 
consideration to strengthen the benefits of mergers.219 It is argued through interpreting South 
African merger law that although efficiencies may be a long-term key to achieving social and 
political goals of competition law there is room to effectively derive these goals from public 
interest provisions in merger. Including social and political objectives through public interest 
concerns can supplement the benefit of fair distribution of wealth in Kenya. Lastly, this chapter 
will illustrate the divergence and conflicts of conflating public interest and efficiencies in 
mergers.  
The first part will briefly review the relevant literature on the role of efficiencies in 
promoting resource allocation. The second part will analyse the efficiency defence in mergers 
once mergers are found anti-competitive. This part will look at the type of efficiencies and 
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thereafter examine the different welfare standards in mergers. Thereafter, this part will delve into 
a comparative study of interpretation of efficiencies in Kenya and South Africa. The second part 
will look at the public interest inquiry in mergers. This part will analyse the equity, social and 
political objectives of competition law. The last part will analyse merger remedies as additional 
tools for competition authorities to fix anti-competitive effects of mergers while preserving 
benefits such as efficiencies. 
 
2.  WEALTH DISTRIBUTION THROUGH SOCIAL AND POLITICAL GOALS OF 
COMPETITION LAW  
 
The promotion of competition is necessary as a more efficient means of allocation of 
resources in an economy as compared to other means.220 In extension, improving resource 
allocation in an economy can be an effective way of improving the average standard of living of 
the population.221 The economic goal of competition policy seeks to increase ‘the material 
welfare of society through the instrument of inter-firm rivalry’.222 This goal has been described 
as having both ‘an end result and a preferred means by which that result is to be achieved’.223 
The end result is to enhance the aggregate social wealth referred to as the economic efficiency 
which is constrained by consumers receiving an appropriate share of the wealth through 
consumer welfare.224 Competition law changes the incentives of business firms ‘to ensure that 
the pursuit of private profit more fully promotes social welfare’.225 An important aspect of 
competition welfare is therefore economic efficiency. An effective competition law must 
reconcile the aggregate interest in maximising social wealth through efficiency with consumer 
interests through consumer welfare.226 
According to Brodley, in assessing the key efficiency goals for competition policy and in 
the consequent allocation of resources among these goals, a competition authority must consider 
their importance and legal measurability.227 Importance of efficiencies means ‘the relative 
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contribution a particular type of efficiency makes to increases in social wealth over time and 
across the whole economy’.228 Legal measurability refers to the ‘ability of courts to determine 
whether a particular transaction will increase social wealth and to measure roughly its 
magnitude’.229 
 
There is a wide consensus that competition authorities should not be engrossed in the 
short term effects of merger but place considerable emphasis on dynamic and long term aspects 
of competition.230 Social and political objectives such as inequality, income distribution and the 




3. THE EFFICIENCY DEFENCE  
 
Economic efficiency refers to ‘a decision or event that increases the total value of all 
economically measurable assets in the society or total social wealth’.232 The ‘efficiency defence’ 
recognises the important role of merger control which is facilitating the attainment of 
efficiencies.233 However, jurisdictions differ in their approaches to efficiencies in mergers. This 
difference is based on two views. First, there is a general view that efficiency gains are more 
likely to be achieved in competitive markets. 234 Here the purpose of competition law is to ensure 
that competitive markets allocate production and consumers purchase products in an efficient 
manner.235 Secondly, some jurisdictions recognise the possibility of alternative ways of attaining 
efficiencies besides preserving competitive markets.236  
In practice, competition authorities analyse mergers in a ‘two-step’ approach where the 
likelihood of substantially lessening or preventing competition by a merger precedes analysing 
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the efficiencies from the merger.237 Efficiencies in merger analysis are relevant where a merger 
is found anti-competitive.238 Where the effects of the merger are found pro-competitive, no 
further inquiry is made and the merger is approved.239 The rationale for this two-step approach is 
first, competition authorities will only undertake analysing efficiencies when necessary since it is 
difficult to identify and quantify efficiencies.240 Secondly, only the parties to the merger have 
better access to information pertinent to an efficiency claim.241 
3.1 Types of efficiency  
 
There are four categories of efficiencies. First, dynamic efficiencies are efficiencies in 
innovation that develop efficient production processes, introduce new products, use resources, 
product and service quality.242 Dynamic efficiencies are difficult to analyse because they are 
difficult to calculate, verify and generalise because the presence of market power can either 
promote innovation or hinder it.243 Innovation through dynamic efficiency is described as being 
the ‘most important determinant for long-term economic growth’ and that ‘innovation and 
diffusion of new products and technologies’ is one of the significant results that effective 
competition should realise.244 
Secondly, production efficiencies are economic cost saving efficiencies in production 
processes that allow firms to produce more or better quality output from the same amount of 
input.245 Savings in cost of production through economies of scale and specialisation are first 
efficiencies in purchasing, distribution, advertising, capital raising, complementary resources and 
research and development.246 Secondly, savings derived from transaction costs through 
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integrating previously external functions.247 Lastly, savings derived from the transfer of superior 
production techniques and knowledge.248  
Thirdly, pecuniary efficiencies result from merged entities gaining greater bargaining 
power and lower input costs.249Although they are easier to measure compared to other 
efficiencies, they ‘are not considered real savings in resources and are less favoured’ and ‘should 
not form the basis of an efficiency defence’ because they only ‘lead to a redistribution of 
resources’. 250  
Collectively, allocative efficiencies are realised through allocating existing stock of 
goods and productive output through the price system to purchasers who are willing to pay or to 
forego other consumption.251 
3.2 Welfare Standards 
 
Economic welfare is the measure that aggregates the welfare of different groups of 
market participants in an economy.252  These different groups of market participants are 
measured in two main categories, consumers and producers through analysing consumer, 
producer and total surplus.253 Consumer surplus is the difference between what consumers 
collectively pay for a product in a market and the value that each consumer is willing to pay over 
the actual price.254 Producer surplus is the difference between the price that producers 
collectively receive for their products in a market and the sum of the producers' respective cost in 
the increase or decrease in making one extra unit of a product at each level of output.255 Total 
surplus is ‘the sum of producer surplus and consumer surplus’.256 Welfare standard is the welfare 
that a competition authority seeks to maximise when balancing the aggregate welfare of 
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consumer and producer surplus.257  This part will assess the different types of welfare standards 
and how these standards relate to efficiencies.258 
3.2.1 Total Surplus Standard 
The total surplus standard ‘does not consider consumer or producer interests’ it merely 
measures the ‘total gain by society’ against the ‘total loss by society’ and if positive the merger 
will be approved.259 Under the total surplus standard, the weight to consumers and producers is 
considered equal therefore shifting a rand from consumers to producers has ‘neutral effects’ on a 
merger.260 A merger can be approved where consumers were worse off post-merger than pre-
merger and the merger results in gains to the producers that outweigh losses to consumers or the 
merger resulting in price increase or harmful effects to consumers.261 
Under the total surplus standard, the purpose of competition law is not to promote 
efficiency but ‘the promotion of competition does not take place at the expense of efficiency, 
especially as efficiency also forms the rationale for the promotion of competition’.262 The 
rationale behind the total surplus standard is that ‘money is circulated in the economy, it is 
irrelevant who holds it, as money is of the same value in anyone’s hands producers could be 
consumers on the next level’.263 Further, under the total surplus standard the efficiencies may be 
beneficial to consumers in a different market to the relevant market where the anti-competitive 
effects of the merger are felt.264 
 
This standard requires calculating a range of possibilities regarding ‘the elasticity of 
demand for the relevant product and the anticipated price increase’.265 This standard is difficult 
to apply since it involves calculating of a range of probabilities whose values are unknown.266 
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The Competition Tribunal of Canada used the total surplus standard in interpreting merger 
review under the Competition Act of Canada.267  
In Commissioner of Competition v Superior Propane Inc., the Competition Tribunal of 
Canada applied the total surplus standard in merger review.268 According to the Tribunal, when 
market power results in price increase of a product,  allocative efficiency is reduced since 
consumers acquire less of the product and switch to lower valued substitutes.269 Productive 
efficiency is also reduced because output falls and economic resources are diverted to the 
producing substitutes due to less consumption of the product.270 An increase in the product price 
means loss in consumer surplus as compared to paying under competitive prices.271 Loss in 
consumer surplus is first realised by the firm and its shareholders in the form of increase in 
profits.272 The Tribunal interpreted such loss as ‘not a social loss, but rather a redistribution of 
gains from the merger; real resource use is not affected by this transfer of income’.273 Loss in 
consumer surplus may result in ‘deadweight loss’ which is a social loss consisting of ‘the 
remaining loss of consumer surplus, beyond that realised by the shareholders in the form of 
increased profits’.274 This deadweight loss measures ‘the allocative and technical inefficiency 
caused by the exercise of market power and represents the economic effect of the merger’.275  
Under the total surplus standard ‘efficiencies need only exceed the deadweight loss to 
save an anti-competitive merger’.276 According to the Competition Tribunal of Canada, the total 
surplus standard ‘addresses solely the effects of a merger on economic resources’ and not 
‘whether shareholders will be better off at the expense of consumers, but rather whether the 
economy gains more resources than it loses through the transaction’.277 The Tribunal preferred 
the total surplus standard because the Competition Act of Canada was not concerned with 
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distributional concerns in mergers and it allowed predictability in merger review.278 The Tribunal 
interpreted the underlying purpose of the Competition Act of Canada as maintaining and 
encouraging competition in order to promote efficiency.279 The statutory means of achieving this 
purpose was through encouraging competition while the desired end was efficiency.280 In case of 
a conflict between competition and efficiency, the later will prevail allowing an anti-competitive 
merger to be approved.281 
3.2.2 Consumer Surplus Standard  
 
Under the consumer surplus standard, competition is viewed as ‘an end itself rather than 
a means to attainment of the paramount goal of wealth maximisation’. 282 The consumer surplus 
standard requires efficiency gains to be substantial and ensures mergers will not result in wealth 
transfer from consumers to producers leaving consumers worse off post-merger than pre-
merger.283 Efficiencies must be substantial to enable profit maximisation not resulting in price 
increase post-merger. 284 However, this standard not only focuses on price reduction post-
merger, it also accounts for non-price benefits.285 Under this standard a merger is prohibited once 
found anti-competitive and cannot proceed by merging parties showing that efficiencies 
outweigh the resultant anti-competitive effects.286 Efficiencies under the consumer surplus 
standard ‘must be shown to reverse the anti-competitive effects likely to arise without them’.287   
Under the consumer surplus standard, the competition authority is concerned with the 
likelihood of achieving the claimed efficiencies, failure of which the economy will be burdened 
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with an anti-competitive merger.288 The higher the level of concentration of the relevant market 
the greater the concern of achieving efficiencies or if achieved not passing to consumers.289 In 
analysing efficiencies, the recommended approach is the ‘sequential approach’ where a low 
concentration level is assumed for mergers that do not pose competitive concerns and there is no 
need for taking efficiencies into account. 290 With a high concentration level, the assumption is 
efficiencies will not be taken into account and mergers will not be approved if it is anti-
competitive.291 Where a merger falls between these concentration levels, efficiencies are 
determined on a factual basis where they can only impact if the anti-competitive effects of a 
merger are limited but significant to require that the merger be prohibited if no efficiencies were 
to result.292 In the consumer surplus standard there is need for exercise of discretion by 
competition authorities to determine the threshold which efficiency gains will not be considered 
since it may be difficult to agree on such.293 
A consumer surplus standard is driven by ‘the protection of competition, and not the 
achievement of distributional goals’.294 The consumer surplus standard is used by the European 
Commission Merger Guidelines.295 Under the European Union guidelines on horizontal mergers, 
the European Commission recognises the benefits of effective competition as including 
innovation.296 The Commission prevents mergers from depriving consumers of the benefits of 
effective competition through firm’s significantly increasing market power.297 The Commission 
interprets increase in market power as referring to producer’s market power and including 
‘increase prices, reduce output, choice or quality of goods and services [and] diminish 
innovation’.298 
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3.2.3 Balancing Weight Standard 
The balancing weight standard considers the distributive effects of mergers where the 
benefit to producers is compared to the loss suffered by consumers.299 This benefit to producers 
is attributed to greater efficiency and redistribution from consumers.300 The loss suffered by 
consumers is attributed to both the redistribution of surplus to producers and the inability of 
consumers to purchase a product due to price increase and reduction in output produced resulting 
from market power increased by the merger.301 A balancing weight is attached to the loss to 
consumers that balances it with the benefits of the merger to producers.302 The weight to 
consumers is measured ‘by society or should reflect social attitudes toward equity among 
different income classes’.303 The competition authority will thereafter determine whether the 
weight attached to the interests of consumers is equal to or greater than the balancing weight, if 
so then the merger should not be allowed on efficiency grounds.304  
The balancing weight standard is premised on the distribution effects of a merger that 
gives greater weight to consumers.305 The standard has been criticised as presuming that 
consumers are a homogenous group and does not consider other related markets in the merger.306  
The Appeal Court in Canada applied the balancing weight approach in reversing the 
appeal from Canadian Tribunal judgement in Canada (Commissioner of Competition) v. 
Superior Propane Inc.307 In Canada (Commissioner of Competition) v. Superior Propane Inc. 
the Appeal Court interpreted the effects of preventing or lessening competition under subsection 
96(1) as not exclusively focusing on the objective of the promoting competition where loss is 
restricted to deadweight loss.308 The Appeal Court interpreted the effects of preventing or 
lessening competition as including the ‘other statutory objectives to be served by the 
encouragement of competition that an anti-competitive merger may frustrate, such as the ability 
of medium and small businesses to participate in the economy, and the availability to consumers 
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of a choice of goods at competitive prices’.309 The Appeal Court was reluctant to accept that 
parliament would allow an anti-competitive merger to proceed regardless of raising prices 
provided that its efficiencies exceeded the resulting loss of resources to the economy.310 The 
Appeal Court held that the balancing weight approach was ‘more reflective than the total surplus 
standard of the different objectives of the Competition Act’.311 
3.3 Kenya  
 
Section 46 (2) (h) of the Competition Act of Kenya provides that the Authority may base 
its determination in relation to a proposed merger on ‘any benefits likely to be derived from the 
proposed merger relating to research and development, technical efficiency, increased 
production, efficient distribution of goods or provision of services and access to markets’.  This 
provision refers to the efficiency defence. However, there is no indication from the wording of 
the Act of a two-stage approach where efficiencies succeed the substantially lessening or 
prevention of competition (SLC) test. The efficiency defence can be deducted from the reference 
to ‘technical efficiency’ ‘increased production’ ‘efficient distribution of goods or provision of 
services’. In addition with the reference to ‘benefits likely to be derived’ it is inconceivable that 
the Authority can assess the benefits of a proposed merger autonomous without looking at the 
effects of a merger.  
 
The efficiency benefits under the Competition Act of Kenya include both dynamic and 
production efficiencies.  These benefits such as technical efficiency, increased production and 
efficient distribution of goods or provision of services are arguably competition based since they 
can be arrived at through financial and economic knowledge. Other benefits such as research and 
development, technical efficiency and increased production are market specific such that only 
merging parties or competitors disputing the merger are privy to such information. This list of 
benefits is exhaustive as it does not use the words like ‘including’ unlike other sub sections of 
section 46 (2) which can be interpreted as non-exhaustive.312 
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The Authority has also issued guidelines on the general analysis of mergers.313 The 
Authority in its guidelines acknowledges that ‘horizontal and non-horizontal mergers may lead to 
pro-competitive effects owing to efficiencies that are realised by the mergers’.314 Efficiencies, 
under the guidelines, include both production efficiencies from production, distribution and 
marketing activities and dynamic efficiencies from greater innovation yields by combining 
investment in research and development.315 The Authority acknowledges that dynamic 
efficiencies are the most difficult to verify.316 According to the merger guidelines, the Authority 
considers three effects of efficiencies. First, whether the evidence on efficiency is sufficient to 
negate any findings of substantial lessening of competition of the merger.317 Second, whether the 
claimed efficiencies are likely to prevent a substantial lessening of competition.318 Lastly, the 
Authority considers whether the efficiencies result in consumer benefits over a reasonable period 
of time that would not have accrued without the merger.319 The guidelines place the onus of 
presenting the evidence of an efficiency claim on the merging parties.320 Once the evidence is 
presented, the Authority considers whether the claimed efficiencies are likely to result in the 
merging parties ‘acting pro-competitively, to the benefit of consumers, in the post-merger 
market’.321 According to the guidelines, efficiencies are determined on a case-by-case basis must 
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3.4 South Africa  
 
Section 12A (1) (i) of the Competition Act of South Africa provides that where a merger 
is likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition, the Competition Commission or Tribunal 
must then determine: 
‘whether or not the merger is likely to result in any technological, efficiency or 
other pro-competitive gain which will be greater than, and offset, the effects of any 
prevention or lessening of competition, that may result or is likely to result from the 
merger, and would not likely be obtained if the merger is prevented’. 
 
The South African approach to efficiencies was analysed by the Competition Tribunal in 
Trident Steel Limited/ Dorbyl Limited.323 The Tribunal first noted that the efficiency provision at 
the time was adopted from section 96 (1) of the Canadian Act.324 Section 96 (1) of the Canadian 
Act was further interpreted as ‘a merger can both lessen competition and create efficiencies and 
that a proper enforcement policy should seek to maximise overall efficiency in the economy’.325 
The Tribunal further noted that section 96 (1) of the Canadian Act was influenced by US 
economist Oliver Williamson’s hypothesis known as the Williamson trade-off.326  
The Williamson trade-off argues that ‘cost efficiencies would be far greater than social 
losses resulting from increased economic power…a relatively small cost reduction would offset a 
relatively large price increase thereby making society indifferent to the merger’.327 The 
Williamson trade-off has been linked to the total surplus standard.328 The court held that the 
‘trade-off’ applied in South Africa and did not address this issue any further.329 In determining 
whether a merger can be justified based on dynamic or production efficiency, a major concern is 
the conflict between production or dynamic efficiency and allocative efficiency.330 The 
Williamson trade-off seeks to balance increase in production efficiency and allocative 
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inefficiencies in a merger.331 According to the Williamson trade-off, a merger may lead to 
welfare loss by increasing market power and allocative inefficiency in the form of a dead weight 
loss and on the other hand, the merger may achieve a welfare gain by increasing production 
efficiency.332 According to the Williamson, economic calculation often shows that welfare gain 
through production efficiency will exceed the loss by allocative inefficiency.333  
In Trident Steel Limited/ Dorbyl Limited the Tribunal addressed analysed efficiencies 
under five issues: 
‘(1)The onus of establishing the efficiency gain? 
 (2) The types of acceptable gains? 
          (3) How the offset or trade-off between the competitive loss and the efficiency gain is 
calibrated? 
 (4) Whether the gain needs to be passed on to the consumer?  
 (5) Whether the efficiency is merger specific?’334 
 
This paper will conflate these issues into four as follows: 
 
3.4.1 Onus 
According to the Tribunal, the onus of establishing the efficiency defence rests on 
merging parties.335 This is because identifying and quantifying post-merger efficiencies at the 
pre-merger stage is difficult.336 Further, the parties to the merger compared to the competition 
authorities, are best placed to provide information on efficiencies.337 
 
3.4.2 Whether the efficiency is merger specific? 
The tribunal interpreted the words ‘would not likely be obtained if the merger is 
prevented’ to mean the efficiencies must arise as a result of the merger.338 The efficiency defence 
fails ‘if the efficiencies could come about through some other legal arrangement or 
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organisational form that is not a merger, or if one of the firms could achieve a claimed efficiency 
on its own could arise from a legal arrangement or organisation form that is not a merger’.339 
 
3.4.3 Whether the gain needs to be passed on to the consumer?  
The Tribunal recognised that a merger proves anti-competitive where ‘there is wealth 
transfer from consumers to producers’.340 According to the Tribunal, the issue of ‘credibility of 
the claims that efficiency gains will be passed on’ is pertinent.341 It criticised the requirement of 
passing on efficiency gains as a prerequisite to an efficiency defence as ‘a price control remedy’ 
that ‘it is not appropriate for the regulator to become a price setter’.342 However the Tribunal 
found that: 
‘We propose the following test – where efficiencies constitute “real” efficiencies 
and there is evidence to verify them of a quantitative or qualitative nature, evidence that 
the efficiencies will benefit consumers, is less compelling. On the other hand, where 
efficiencies demonstrate less compelling economies, evidence of a pass through to 
consumers should be demonstrated and although no threshold for this is suggested, they 
need to be more than trivial, but neither is it necessary that they are wholly passed on. 
The test is thus one where real economies and benefit to consumers exist in an inverse 
relationship. The more compelling the former the less compelling need be the latter’.343 
 
The Tribunal adopted an inverse relationship between real economies and benefit to 
consumers in determining whether the benefit of the efficiency should pass through to the 
consumer. According to the Tribunal, where efficiencies are “real”, evidence that it benefits 
consumers is less compelling.344 However evidence of a pass through to consumers is required 
where the efficiency ‘demonstrates less compelling economies’.345 The issue is the type of 
efficiencies that fall within ‘real’ and ‘demonstrates less compelling economies’.346 
 
The Tribunal referred to real efficiencies as being dynamic efficiencies and production 
efficiencies ranging from plant economies of scope and scale to research and development 
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efficiencies that might not be achieved without a merger.347 The Tribunal interpreted the 
efficiency provision under the Competition Act of South Africa as differing with the Canadian 
Act due to the inclusion of the words ‘technological or other pro-competitive gain’.348 It applied 
the eiusdem generis interpretation of the words ‘technological gain’ to mean dynamic 
efficiencies while ‘other pro-competitive gain’ to constitute real economies which does not 
include ‘mere pecuniary gains’.349 The Tribunal justified the dynamic nature of competition law 
in South Africa with reference to the purpose of the Competition Act of South Africa under 
section 2 (a) which is ‘to promote the efficiency, adaptability and development of the 
economy’.350 Efficiencies ‘demonstrates less compelling economies’ can be interpreted to 
include pecuniary efficiencies or efficiencies that would ‘result in a mere redistribution of 
income from the customers, suppliers or employees to the merged entity’.351  
 
3.4.4 Measuring the trade-off  
 
The Tribunal interpreted the Competition Act as requiring efficiency gains to be ‘greater 
than’ and ‘offset’ the anticompetitive effects as ‘presupposing a weighing process which 
suggests that efficiencies must be capable of measurement as opposed to broad speculative 
assertions’.352 The Tribunal adopted a two-step approach to analysing efficiencies in mergers as: 
first, verify efficiency gains quantitatively and thereafter establish how the efficiencies trade-off 
against loss to competition.353 The second step is analysing the likelihood of efficiencies.354  
 
In verifying efficiencies, the Tribunal has been criticised as simplifying the process from 
the more established total and consumer surplus standards to a formulaic and flexible 
approach.355 The Tribunal referred to the total surplus standard as ‘formulaic’ where ‘one to 
approach the problem as an economist would do in a classroom demonstrating Williamson’s 
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trade-off’.356 According to the main advantage of using this approach is that efficiencies and 
losses to competition are quantified and calculated therefore upon substantiating the numbers 
‘the outcome is definitive’.357 However, the problem with this approach is that losses and gains 
are difficult to calculate since they are not always quantified and measured by the same units.358 
Further, market power effects may result in price increase by other firms understating the loss to 
consumers.359  
 
The flexible approach on the other hand ‘the competition adjudicator relies on its 
discretion rather than an equation’.360 The competition authority can only exercise its discretion 
under the flexible approach once a formulated policy approach has been established to guide it in 
its evaluation.361 The Tribunal noted that this approach created some uncertainty since parties 
may not know in advance whether their claims of efficiency will be accepted. 362 The Tribunal 
settled for the flexible approach which although it conceded ‘may be criticized for giving the 
competition authority too much discretion at the expense of business certainty’ it found that the 
formulaic approach ‘permits an approach so clinical and rigid that it would reduce the proper 
exercise of a discretion to a matter of calculus’.363 
 
3.5 Analysing the appropriate welfare standard in Kenya  
 
As noted above the Trident Steel/Dorbyl Limited approach has been heavily criticised. 
However, it can be justified to some extent. First, efficiency is a ‘defence’ by the merging parties 
after a proposed merger is found anti-competitive. The merging parties have the onus of 
providing the information and evidence to support their efficiency claim which the competition 
authority is not privy to. Surely a competition authority must have some discretion in verifying 
and the assessing the likelihood of the efficiencies once a merger is found anti-competitive. 
Secondly, as previously shown in the analysis of the welfare standard of efficiency, these 
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standards are premised on the goals of competition law in the different jurisdictions. Although a 
jurisdiction may have transplanted merger provisions, the competition policy and goals of 
competition law may differ on the welfare standard. Such balance between the goals of 
competition and efficiencies under merger review are preferably left to the discretion by a 
competition authority since merging parties are less likely to have distributive agendas when 
finalising merger agreements.  
 
However, such a flexible approach can be difficult to apply in Kenya. Developing 
countries, like Kenya where corruption is prevalent, discretion on competition authority should 
be avoided since there is a likelihood of false negatives in jurisdictions where corruption is 
prevalent. The analysis of efficiencies must be subject to the goals of competition law of the 
jurisdiction. These goals can inform the type of welfare standard to be applied.  
 
According to the Competition Act of Kenya, the object of the Act is to ‘enhance the 
welfare of the people of Kenya by promoting and protecting effective competition in markets and 
preventing unfair and misleading market conduct throughout Kenya’.364 The goal of the Act is 
to:  
‘(a) increase efficiency in the production, distribution and supply of goods and services;  
(b) promote innovation;  
(c) maximise the efficient allocation of resources; 
(d) protect consumers; 
(e) create an environment conducive for investment, both foreign and local; 
(f) capture national obligations in competition matters with respect to regional integration 
initiatives; 
(g) bring national competition law, policy and practice in line with best international 
practices;  
(h) promote the competitiveness of national undertakings in world markets.’365 
 
The object of the Competition Act is to enhance the welfare of the people of Kenya. This 
reference although inextricably includes consumers, can also be interpreted as referring to the 
society as a whole. The legislature would have simply referred to the object of the Act as 
‘enhancing consumer welfare’ noting that the preamble of the Act provides that it is ‘an Act of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






Parliament to promote and safeguard competition in the national economy; to protect consumers 
from unfair and misleading market conduct…’. This is the first reference to ‘people of Kenya’ 
amidst the numerous references to consumer protection. This paper argues that the object of the 
Act is inclined towards a total surplus standard. Further, the goals of the Competition Act are 
inclined on either promoting efficiency under section 3 (a), (b) and (c) or promoting competition 
under section 3 (e), (g) and (h). Only section 3 (d) refers to protecting consumers. Although there 
is no indication of hierarchy of achieving goals under the purpose section, the goals of 
maximising efficient allocation of resources, increase production efficiency and promoting 
dynamic efficiency are quite predominant and can be deduced from an economic calculation. 
Specifically, the goal of maximising efficient resource allocation points to a total surplus 
approach. Further, there is no reference to distributional goals under the purpose section.  
 
The merger guidelines by the Competition Authority, on the other hand, are more 
inclined to supporting a consumer surplus standard where the emphasis is on whether 
efficiencies result in consumer benefits. These guidelines dwell on one among eight of the goals 
under section 3 (d) which is to protect consumers. According to the guidelines, efficiencies must 
demonstrate benefits to consumers.366 
 
Mergers acknowledge the two main effects of anti-competitive increase in prices post-
merger as the transfer of wealth from consumers to producers and reduction in allocative 
efficiency.367 The transfer of wealth from consumers to producers represents a decrease in 
society’s absolute wealth while allocative inefficiency represents redistribution of wealth.368 The 
Competition Authority of Kenya is therefore balancing consumer welfare and promoting 
efficiency. The tension in the goals of the Competition Act of Kenya is to increase and promote 
dynamic and production efficiencies versus maintaining allocative efficiency. The goals of the 
Competition Act of Kenya do not leave any room for distribution goals.  
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There is a general consensus that dynamic efficiencies are the most important among 
efficiencies.369 However, the guidelines by the Competition Authority of Kenya lay more 
emphasis on production efficiencies. This paper submits that this very correct and commendable. 
The foundations and development of competition law has been documented and argued from an 
anti-trust and European Union perspective. As mentioned in the previous chapter, US and UK 
are an innovation-based economy where the level of productivity is determined by producing 
new and different goods using the most sophisticated production and business processes and 
innovation. On the other hand, Kenya is a factor-driven economy where the level of productivity 
is determined by labour, public and private institutions, infrastructure and a stable macro-
economic environment.  
 
4. PUBLIC INTEREST  
Public interest is confined to political discourse where ‘judicial interpretation of public 
interest constitutes a limitation of the legal scope of government’s intervention in the economy, 
and provides the judiciary with a rhetorical base for resolving questions of political economy’.370 
Arguably, public interest considerations in competition law might not be efficient in allowing 
redistribution of income.371 Public interest as a tool for redistribution may result in ‘distortions 
induced by the redistribution itself’.372 Such distortions may arise from ‘tax upon consumers for 
the benefit of producers’ in the presence of conflict between small-producer welfare like small 
medium sized enterprises and the goal of consumer welfare where inefficient firms may be 
protected overruling any considerations of efficient resource allocation.373  
Public interest considerations inquire why the state would allow a ‘subservient 
government agency’ to engage in political discourse such as industrial policy when it can do so 
more directly and effectively for example through taxation.374 Arguably, the necessity of the 
state delegating redistribution to competition agencies may arise from the state’s degree of 
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redistribution being limited or state agencies err in redistribution through matters of ethics or 
politics.375 This argument may be applied in developing countries with socio-economic 
challenges such as high inequality or institutional challenges such corrupt. 
Efficiency in competition law can be summarised as ‘the maximization of the value of 
total output’ by supplying products according to consumer preferences and minimising 
production costs.376  The ‘residual political and social goals’ after defining efficiency as 
maximisation of output are referred to as ‘equity objectives’.377 Equity objectives in competition 
law are mainly concerned with the ‘income redistribution’ and other policies favouring small 
business organizations or minority groups.378  The significance of the term ‘income 
redistribution’ acknowledges the function of competition law in protecting those at the low end 
of income distribution by reducing prices and allowing how ‘a larger basket of goods and 
services can be purchased’.379 Competition law also seeks to achieve income distribution without 
decreasing efficiency.380 Therefore, a merger analysis would require weighing gains and losses in 
efficiency in order to establish whether the merger is in the public interest.381  
4.1 Public Interest Inquiry in Kenya   
 
According to section 46 (2) (c) to (g) of the Competition Act, the Authority considers the 
extent to which the proposed merger would likely affect: 
a) a particular industrial sector or region;  
b) employment;  
c) the ability of small undertakings to gain access to or to be competitive in any 
market;  
d) the ability of national industries to compete in international markets; and  
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e) result in a benefit to the public which would outweigh any detriment likely to 
result from any undertaking, including one not involved as a party in the proposed 
merger, acquiring or strengthening a dominant position in a market. 
 
The Competition Authority has issued guidelines on the public interest inquiry for merger 
analysis.382 Under the public interest guidelines, the Authority shall consider the extent to which 
a merger would affect the factors stated out under section 46 (2) (c) to (g) and includes a fifth 
factor as ‘salvaging of dormant and failing firm’.383 The Authority under its guidelines 
undertakes to expedite mergers involving failing, dormant firms or firms under receivership in 
order to save jobs and afford consumers choices.384 These public interest considerations are 
determined on the facts of each case.385 
 
4.1.1 Particular industrial sector or region. 
 
Under this provision, the Authority focuses first on ensuring stability and growth of 
individual industrial sectors.386 Secondly, the Authority may require the acquiring firm to invest 
significantly in research and development in the sector in order to afford consumers choices at 
reduced cost.387 Lastly, the Authority may approve the merger with the conditions on expanding 
capacity and products in the sector as stipulated by parties in their merger application.388 
 
The public interest guidelines focus on the media sector. According to the guidelines, the 
Authority seeks to ‘encourage media plurality, diversity and production of local content’.389 The 
Authority achieves this through considering whether the merger affects: the strength and 
competitiveness of local media business, the spread of ownership or control of media businesses 
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and the reflection of the diversity of local content in media.390 According to the guidelines, the 
focus on the media sector in Kenya is ‘aimed at supporting local production, hence increased 
employment, especially for the youth’.391  
 
Further, the guidelines provide that mergers involving ‘utility companies’ shall be 
considered ‘with utmost scrutiny’ under both the substantial lessening of competition and public 
interest considerations.392 Through scrutinising mergers involving utility companies, the 
guidelines use public interest to ‘protect vulnerable members of the society not affected as a 
result of the merger’ including sectors with a high impact on the poor.393 
 
4.1.2 Employment  
 
The guidelines emphasise enhancing and sustaining employment by ensuring no 
substantial job losses occur as a result of mergers, salvaging failing or dormant firms and 
encouraging merger of media firms that will enhance local production that support youth 
employment.394 In merger considerations, the guidelines expect parties to give a definitive 
analysis of merger effects on employment.395 Parties must demonstrate that a rational process has 
been followed to arrive at the determination of the number of jobs lost and the employment loss 
is balanced by an equally weighty but countervailing public interest under the Act justifying the 
job loss.396 However, job loss can only be balanced by a countervailing efficiency argument if 
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4.1.3 Ability of small undertakings to gain access to or to be competitive in any market 
 
Under the public interest guidelines, mergers involving small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) will be expedited as a way to enhance their capacity to enter certain markets ‘in order to 
offer credible competition and enhance employment’.398 
 
4.1.4 Ability of national industries to compete in international markets 
 
This public interest consideration focuses on the export market. The guidelines support 
local firms being more competitive in the international market in order to ‘facilitate expansion of 
Kenya’s foreign exchange earnings’.399 Mergers relating to exports ‘will be under relatively less 
SLC scrutiny so long as they do not have buyer-power to distort competition to the detriment of 
their suppliers, especially the local ones’.400 
4.1.5 Benefit to the public outweighing the detriment 
 
The Authority considers whether a proposed merger would result in a benefit to the 
public outweighing any likely detriment from the acquisition or strengthening a dominant 
position in a market. Interestingly, this consideration extends to ‘an undertaking not involved as 
a party in the proposed merger’.401 This reference may apply to conglomerate mergers under the 
Act.402  
4.2 South Africa 
The Competition Act of South Africa has social and political goals. Section 2 of the Act 
provides that: 
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 ‘The purpose of this Act is to promote and maintain competition in the Republic in  
               order – 
(a) to promote the efficiency, adaptability and development of the economy;  
(b) to provide consumers with competitive prices and product choices;  
(c) to promote employment and advance the social and economic welfare of South  
Africans;  
(d) to expand opportunities for South African participation in world markets and 
recognise the role of foreign competition in the Republic;  
(e) to ensure that small and medium-sized enterprises have an equitable 
opportunity to participate in the economy; and 
(f) to promote a greater spread of ownership, in particular to increase the 
ownership stakes of historically disadvantaged persons.’ 
 
These social and political goals are reflected under section 12A (1) (a) (ii) 
‘whether the merger can or cannot be justified on substantial public interest grounds by 
assessing the factors set out in subsection (3)’. These factors, under 12A (3), are the 
effect of a merger on: 
‘(a) a particular industrial sector or region; 
(b) employment; 
(c) the ability of small businesses, or firms controlled or owned by historically 
disadvantaged persons, to become competitive; and 
(d) the ability of national industries to compete in international markets’.  
In Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited/Goldfields Limited, the Tribunal interpreted 
the words ‘can or cannot’ as instructing that public interest can have ‘both adverse and benign 
effects’ and the competition authority ‘is required to balance the positive and negative outcomes 
and come to a net conclusion on the public interest’.403 Further, the Tribunal interpreted the word 
‘justified’ to mean the conclusion from a public interest inquiry is not independent and must 
acknowledge the conclusion from the competitive effects of the merger.404 Therefore, the public 
interest concerns under the purpose of the Act are dependent on the competition context of the 
merger.405 According to the Tribunal, a merger is not in itself so ‘inherently harmful’ that failure 
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to shown that it is beneficial to the public interest it will be prohibited.406 It is not necessary for 
merging parties to establish that the merger can be justified on a public interest ground all that is 
required is that it will not have a likely anti-competitive effect.407  
This judgment affirms that a public interest inquiry differs from an efficiency inquiry. 
Under efficiency where a merger is anti-competitive, the merging parties can establish that there 
is efficiency from the merger that justifies approval of a merger. Once a prima facie substantial 
public interest ground has been raised the evidential burden will shift to the merging parties to 
rebut it.408 The rationale behind this is the merging parties are less concerned with wider 
industrial policy and public interest concerns.409  
The relationship between efficiency and public interest was highlighted in 
Metropolitan/Momentum.410 The Tribunal distinguished efficiency as a private gain compared to 
public interest, therefore an efficiency gain must be justified on a public ground in order to 
countervail public interest concerns.411 An illustration of a private interest is a merger resulting 
in job losses as cost saving measures but is a gain to the shareholders under efficiencies.412  
A public interest concern must be merger specific.413 The public interest inquiry under 
the Act is not similar to the constitutional approach to public interest.414 The competition 
authority will inquire whether the public concern is ‘sufficiently closely related to the merger’ in 
order to determine whether it is part of the broader merger decision-making process.415 In the 
instance where there are several contradictory public interest concerns, each public interest 
ground should be viewed in isolation to determine if it is substantial.416 Where there are more 
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than one substantial public interest concerns that are contradictory, the authority will determine 
whether these concerns can be reconciled or balance to reach a ‘net conclusion’.417 
The Appeal Court in Wal-Mart/Massmart adopted a holistic interpretation of the public 
interest inquiry under the Act.418 The Appeal Court found that the Act ‘would appear to enjoin 
the Tribunal to initially examine the transaction within a traditional consumer welfare standard 
and, thereafter, to test its initial finding further in terms of the broader [public interest] inquiry as 
mandated in terms of s 12 A (2) read with s 12 A (3)’.419 Interestingly this holistic interpretation 
by the Appeal Court interpreted the public interest inquiry in ‘an economic perspective that 
extends beyond a standard consumer welfare approach’.420 Arguably, this holistic interpretation 
of public interests complements the Tribunal’s judgment in Harmony Gold, that the public 
interest inquiry is not independent to the competition evaluation.  
The Appeal Court conceded that ‘the adoption of a standard other than that of consumer 
welfare would significantly complicate the implementation of the Act, particularly owing to the 
complexity of the economic calculation of total welfare of a particular transaction, particularly if 
total welfare extended beyond an exclusive calculation of consumer and producer surplus 
alone’.421 Further, the Appeal Court emphasised the difficulty in the economic evaluation to the 
‘scarce technical resources available to the competition authorities’.422  
The Appeal Court also addressed the important issue of the weight placed on public 
interest considerations in merger review. According to the Appeal Court, in determining the 
weight ‘an engagement with an exercise of proportionality is then required to determine how to 
balance the competing arguments’ between consumer welfare and the public interest 
considerations.423 The Appeal Court admitted that the proportionality exercise may not be 
precise due to the scarcity of technical resources available to the competition authorities and the 
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economic tools available.424  This proportionality exercise would allow a balance between the 
competing issues of consumer welfare and public interest concerns.425  
The major concern under the weight placed on public interest is whether public interest 
considerations would displace consumer benefit.426 The Appeal Court interpreted ‘substantial’ as 
advocating for considerable weight must be placed on these grounds.427 The proportionality 
exercise requires sufficient evidence.428 In order to prohibit a merger, evidence should support 
that public interest concerns will ‘trump’ the benefits of the merger to consumers.429 Competition 
authorities should exercise caution not to use public interest as a basis of intervention.430 The role 
played by competition authorities in defending public interest is secondary to other statutory and 
regulatory instruments and are advised not to pursue public interest in an ‘overzealous manner’ 
destroying the very interests they seek to protect.431 These other statutory and regulatory 
instruments are better placed and resourced to deal directly and effectively with the public 
interest concerns.432 The jurisdiction of the competition authority in public interest is ‘secondary’ 
to other statutes and regulatory instruments and the discretion of the competition authority ‘at a 
high level of abstraction and generality’.433 
4.2.1 Employment 
Employment is a distinct public interest concern since it overlaps with efficiency gains 
and other competitive concerns most notably the failing firm defence. The departure of 
employment from efficiency is in the distinction between job protection and creation.434 Job 
protection is an equity objective with redistributive effects where a ‘trade off or opportunity cost 
of protecting a job and wealth is redistributed between the owners of capital and labour’.435 Job 
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creation, on the other hand, is an efficiency objective that utilises underutilised labour where 
there is no opportunity cost to creating jobs.436 
According to the Tribunal in Unilever Plc /Robertson’s Foods Pty Ltd, the most powerful 
avenue available to trade unions to address employment related issues from mergers is either 
employment legislation or private collective bargaining agreements.437 The Tribunal dealt with 
the ‘residual’ public interest which is ‘not susceptible to or better able to be dealt with under 
another law’.438 Therefore in employment, the competition authority will only intervene where 
the employment effects of the merger are so adverse and cannot be remedied by other law.439 In 
Wal-Mart/Massmart the Appeal Court emphasised that the role of competition law was not to 
provide legal protections to potential disputes of interest which are resolved by collective 
bargaining or disputes of rights protected by labour courts.440   
 
The Tribunal in dealing with employment is not concerned with the number of jobs lost 
but the substantial effect on employment.441 This means that the effects of a merger can be 
‘ameliorated by a retrenchment package and not simply job retention’.442 Once it is established 
that a merger has substantial adverse effect on employment, the merging parties must satisfy two 
criteria. First, they must show that a rational process has been followed to connect the reason for 
job reduction and the number of jobs lost.443 Secondly, the public interest concern on 
employment loss is ‘balanced by an equally weighty, but countervailing public interest, 
justifying the job loss and which is cognisable under the Act’.444 Therefore, a good efficiency 
argument on job loss cannot act to countervail the public interest on employment because the Act 
has been interpreted as distinguishing efficiency gains as private interest gains.445 This is evident 
from the Act requiring mergers, though justified under efficiency grounds, must still undergo 
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public interest evaluation.446 Efficiency gains can only countervail the adverse effects of 
competition.447  
 
4.2.2 Effects on a particular industrial sector or region 
 
When determining whether a merger can be justified on public interest grounds, the effect 
of the merger on a particular industrial sector or region must be considered.448 The use of ‘sector’ 
as opposed to market permits accommodation of a wider range of issues.449 In Nasionale Pers 
Limited/Educational Investment Corporation Limited, the Tribunal observed that the educational 
sector was ‘a particularly important sector of the economy particularly damaged by South 
Africa’s past’ and that the private sector was reasonably expected to play ‘an extremely even 
increasingly important role’ in provision of education to those who suffered as a result of 
apartheid.450 The Tribunal related access of private education providers to the competitiveness of 
the economy and the general well-being and stability of the society.451 
 
The Tribunal in Telkom SA Limited Acquiring Firm/Business Connexion Group Ltd 
interpreted industrial policy considerations as requiring the competition authority to relate the 
nature of products and their role in economic growth and development.452 The Tribunal 
identified the merger as taking place in a ‘pivotal segment of the ICT [information and 
communications technology] sector’ which has implications on the whole sector and accepted 
that ‘the character and effectiveness of the regulatory framework plays an important role in the 
development of the broader ICT sector, most specifically the telecommunications 
components’.453 The sector was found to be pivotal since many other sectors of the economy 
utilise its products and services as vital inputs. 454 The Tribunal analysed the ICT sector and 
deduced that a merger sought to ‘maintain and extend [the] erstwhile statutory monopoly’ and to 
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‘counter the impact of deregulation [that was] public policy’s preferred mechanism for the 
introduction of competition’.455  
 
4.2.3 The ability of small businesses, or firms to become competitive  
 
This paper is concerned with merger provisions in the Competition Act of Kenya based 
on similarities with the Competition Act of South Africa. The paper will not analyse the public 
interest provisions on historically disadvantaged persons, as this pertains only to South Africa 
and is not relevant in the Kenyan context. This part will only deal with the ability of small 
businesses to become competitive. 
 
In Pioneer Hi-Bred International Inc/ Competition Commission of South Africa, the 
Tribunal prohibited a merger that would not have a desirable public interest outcome.456 In this 
case, a small but significant increase in the price of the relevant product (SSNIP test) post-
merger would have severe adverse effects on small-scale commercial and subsistence farmers 
who currently use it to feed their families and communities.457 The SSNIP test was used in public 
interest inquiry to determine the benefit of a merger to small-scale and subsistence farmers in 
addition to consumers.458 
 
In Wal-Mart/Massmart, the Appeal Court weighed the positive effects of a merger 
between a domestic retail chain and Wal-Mart, a large international company, against the losses 
likely to be experienced by small and medium sized businesses.459 The Appeal Court noted that 
Wal-Mart had an efficient and well-coordinated global purchasing operation and superior 
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infrastructure for exploiting global value chains.460 This global value chain for importing 
consumer goods would likely harm and exclude domestic small and medium sized producers and 
suppliers.461 Although the Appeal Court found that there was no sufficient evidence to justify a 
prohibition of the merger, it set conditions that would allow small domestic producers to benefit 
and harness the global supply chain.462 
 
4.2.4 Ability of national industries to compete internationally  
In determining this public interest consideration, the Tribunal first looks at the sector 
where the market where the merger is taking place and its position in the South African 
economy. In Telkom SA Limited/Business Connexion Group Limited, the Tribunal found that a 
merger in the ICT sector had a significant impact on international competitiveness of South 
African firms generally.463 The Tribunal prohibited the merger based on its anti-competitive 
effect but noted such anti-competitive grounds were bolstered by the public interest concerns.464 
If the Tribunal had not found the merger anti-competitive, it would have prohibited the same on 
public interest grounds due to given the particular nature of the relevant product and its role in 
economic growth and development.465 
The Tribunal also looks at the level of competitiveness in the domestic market to 
determine whether the participating firms can compete locally. In Tongaat-Hulett Group 
Limited/Transvaal Suiker Beperk, the Tribunal was sceptical in allowing arguments that a 
precondition for firms to successfully compete internationally, they had to be dominant in the 
domestic market.466 However, the Tribunal found that in some instances economics of scale and 
rationalisation of production units may support such argument.467 The Tribunal was inclined to 
view aggressive and successful competition in international markets as associated with robust 
competition in the domestic market.468 
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4.3 Analysing the place of social and political goals of competition and distribution through 
the public interest inquiry in merger review 
Other than promoting the competitiveness of national undertakings in world markets, it 
stands out, and quite starkly, that there are no social and political goals under the Competition 
Act of Kenya unlike section 2 of the Competition Act of South Africa. Either this is an oversight 
during transplanting provisions from South Africa or simply the legislature did not intend to use 
competition law as a means of attaining distributional goals. We can rightfully question the 
necessity of the public interest inquiry under merger review in Kenya. Although it was a clear 
transplant from South African legislation, engaging in the development of economic policies 
leading to the enactment of the Competition Act illustrate that the competition policy in Kenya 
has similar social and political goals to South Africa. 
The divergence between the public interest inquiry in South Africa and Kenya is in the 
words ‘whether the merger can or cannot be justified’ under the public interest inquiry in the 
Competition Act of South Africa. In South Africa, although the public interest inquiry is not 
independent of the competition analysis of the merger, more weight is placed on this inquiry 
compared to Kenya. In Kenya, the Competition Authority is invited to determine how a merger 
is ‘likely to affect’ public interest. This is quite confusing as this seems to place public interest 
inquiry in the same level as efficiency inquiries. The main challenge with the public interest 
inquiry in Kenya is conflating public interest and efficiencies.  
Kenya seems to apply a wider view to public interest concerns as there is no reference to 
public interest concerns being merger specific. The public interest considerations have not been 
properly utilised and interpreted by the Competition Authority of Kenya. First the consideration 
on the effects of mergers on a particular industrial sector or region is quite narrow. The 
Competition Authority of Kenya has dwelt on the media sector and utility companies in this 
consideration. There is much more to this public interest consideration. The Tribunal in South 
Africa assesses whether a merger takes place in a pivotal sector in economic growth and 
development of the country. Secondly, the reference to the ability of small businesses or firms to 
become competitive is also misplaced and narrow. The Competition Authority of Kenya has 
relegated this public interest concern to a procedural issue of expediting merger process for the 





concern to protect small and local suppliers and producers in South Africa from anti-competitive 
effects of global supply chains. Public interest concerns are social and political goals for the 
benefit of distribution of wealth to the general population, using public interest to benefit 
merging parties is misplaced. 
The Competition Authority of Kenya is not only placing efficiencies parallel to public 
interest considerations; it is mixing up the benefits of both efficiencies and public interests. 
Efficiencies either benefit the consumer surplus, producer surplus or the total surplus the benefit 
of public interests is beyond consumers and producers.  Conflating public interest and 
efficiencies will likely result in false negative errors. Further, conflating public interest and 
efficiencies presumes that mergers are inherently harmful and this places the onus on the 
merging parties to establish that the merger can be justified on public interest.  
The Competition Authority of Kenya must balance the competing arguments between 
consumer welfare and the public interest considerations. This balance should be carried out 
carefully not to create unintended inefficiencies and distortions in reviewing mergers. The 
Competition Authority of Kenya must again borrow from South Africa’s interpretation of the 
public interest inquiry. The Authority must first determine the weight placed on public interest in 
the merger review. In South Africa, legislation applies a substantial test to determine the weight 
of public interests while the competition authorities apply a holistic interpretation to the public 
interest inquiry that reviews mergers beyond consumer welfare. The Competition Authority of 
Kenya can also use the substantial test when dealing with conflicting public interest concerns in 
the same merger.  
5. MERGER REMEDIES 
Remedies serve as an additional tool for competition authorities to fix competition 
problems raised by a merger while simultaneously permitting the realisation of benefits from 
merger such as efficiencies.469 In the absence of remedies, merger review would be ‘binary’ 
either approved or prohibited the merger entirely.470  
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Merger remedies are either structural or behavioural.471 Structural remedies modify the 
allocation of property rights in a market and include divestiture of an entire or partial on-going 
business assets or productive capacity, long term and exclusive licensing of intellectual property 
rights.472 Divestiture is the most common type of structural remedy.473 Divestiture aims to 
preserve competition in a market post-merger by either creating or strengthening an existing 
source of competition through sale of a business or assets to a new or an existing competitor 
independent of the merging parties respectively.474 Divestiture should adequately address the 
expected competitive detriments and enable effective competition in the long term.475  
A suitable divestiture is defined as ‘the smallest operating unit of a business (eg a 
subsidiary or a division) that contains all the relevant operations pertinent to the area of 
competitive overlap and that can compete successfully on a standalone basis’.476  A divestiture of 
an existing business operating on a stand-alone basis as opposed to a collection of assets or a part 
of a business is preferred since it minimises the risk of discouraging a suitable purchaser or 
allowing a suitable purchaser to operate effectively.477 A suitable purchaser should not have any 
significant connections post-merger to the merging parties such as any financial ties.478 A 
divestiture of intellectual property can either be through exclusive assignment, license, right, 
irrevocable or non-terminable with no continuing royalties will be structural unlike a license 
requiring reliance on the licensor for such as upgrades, supplies which is a structural remedy 
with elements of behavioural remedy.479 
Structural remedies are challenged with avoiding unilateral and collusive effects post-
merger. Unilateral effects are due to competition authorities ‘guaranteeing the enforcement or 
creation of viable firm to avoid unilateral effects’ such as dominance by the merged firm drawn 
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from incentives by the merging firms to make sure the purchasing firm is not competitive.480 The 
competition authorities seek to avoid collusive effects post-merger from symmetry where a 
‘more equal distribution of assets relaxes the incentive constraints of both the small and large 
firm and would help collusion’.481 
Behavioural remedies mainly consist of commitments guaranteeing competitors to enjoy 
a ‘level playing field’ by purchasing or using significant assets, inputs or technologies owned by 
merging parties.482 Behavioural remedies can either remedy measures facilitating horizontal 
rivalry or direct control outcomes.483 Remedies can be placed against measures facilitating 
horizontal rivalry such as preventing firms from foreclosing markets and lessening competition 
due to their horizontal market positions.484 Remedies also use vertical integration to distort or 
limit horizontal competition and changing buyers’ behaviour in order to encourage 
competition.485 Remedies directly control outcomes by preventing exploitation of adverse 
competitive effects through controlling price and range of products such as price caps and supply 
commitments.486 
 
Behavioural remedies are appropriate: first, where divestiture is not feasible or 
unacceptable risks such as absence of suitable buyers are present and prohibition is also not 
feasible such as in multi-jurisdictional constraints.487 Secondly, in the case where the anti-
competitive effects of the merger are limited in duration due to factors such as fast changing 
technology.488 Lastly, where the merger has significant benefits and behavioural remedies are 
significantly most effective in preserving these benefits.489 Behavioural remedies require either 
on-going industrial regulation or consistent monitoring which is likely to engage the resources of 
the competition authority post-merger.490 Further, behavioural remedies that control market 
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outcomes are likely to be burdensome to operate and monitor, lack effectiveness and increasingly 




Section 46 (1) (c) of the Competition Act of Kenya provides that the Authority may 
approve the implementation of a merger with conditions. According to the guidelines on 
mergers, the Competition Authority may apply either structural or behavioural conditions where 
a merger is likely to substantially lessen competition.492  Behavioural conditions are enabling 
remedies that allow effective competition and limit the potential for anti-competitive behaviour 
by the merged parties post-merger.493 Behavioural remedies are used where a structural remedy 
is not ‘commercially practical or [also] not appropriate in the case at hand or cannot be 
accomplished within a specified time’.494 The choice of prescribing the type of condition 
depends on the degree of the substantial lessening of competition.495 
 
The guidelines also direct conditions to remedying public interest concerns. Conditions 
on public interest concerns vary according to the specific public interest concern. The Authority 
will determine conditions on public interest concerns on a case-by-case basis and shall apply 
rational, proportionate and enforceable conditions.496  
 
Generally, the objective of a remedy will be to provide practical and effective solutions to 
prevent likely substantial prevention or lessening of competition such as structural market 
changes or public interest concerns.497 The Competition Authority of Kenya ascertains a rational 
link between the issues of concern and the prescribed conditions.498 The Authority also 
acknowledges that certain remedies are costly to impose, implement or monitor.499   
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5.2 South Africa 
 
In South Africa, the Tribunal’s guiding principle for merger remedies is that they must 
first ‘address the competition concerns raised by the merger’ and secondly ‘restore the dynamic 
process of competition that would have existed but for the merger’.500 The Tribunal preferred 
structural remedies to behavioural remedies since ‘they are clean, certain and objective; they deal 
with the substantial lessening of competition and its resulting adverse effects directly and 
comprehensively at source by restoring rivalry; they are void of unwanted, unintended and costly 




Divestiture or structural remedies must leave the merged firm viable after the divestiture 
that would remedy the likely harm to competition as a result of the merger.502 Divestiture must 
enable the merged firm to compete successfully against established competitors.503 A shorter 
divestiture period contributes to the impact of viability of divested assets.504 A short period for 
completion of divestiture eliminates competitive harm.505 The Tribunal quoted the US Federal 
Trade Commission that advocates for ‘up-front’ divestiture that reduces opportunities for interim 
competitive harm by expediting the divestiture process and assures that there will be an 
acceptable buyer for the divested assets from the beginning.506 Divestiture period issued by the 
Tribunal has been between 9 and 12 months.507 
According to the Tribunal, ‘acceptable conditions hinge critically on the viability of the 
divested assets’.508 The divestiture conditions must describe the assets to be divested and the 
purchaser.509 The prospective purchaser of the divested assets must be viable.510 The prospective 
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purchaser must also possess expertise, adequate financial resources and incentive to maintain the 
divested business as a viable and active competitor to the merging parties.511 According to the 
Tribunal, the purpose of the divestiture remedy is to facilitate entry into the market so that the 
market remains competitive and not to assist in creating a competitor with production capability 
and market share.512 
5.2.2 Behavioural conditions 
 
A behavioural remedy should be an effective tool to deter or counteract the anti-
competitive effects of a proposed merger.513 The Tribunal in Pioneer Hi-Bred International Inc, 
Pannar Seed (Pty) Ltd/The Competition Commission of South Africa rejected use of price cap as 
a condition to a merger as they would ‘lead to the type of market distortions associated with 
behavioural remedies’ and would be more effective if accompanied by structural remedies.514 
Further, the Tribunal rejected conditions on licensing of breeds in a hybrid maize seed product 
market since it would not allow timely and sufficient new entry into the relevant market.515 
Behavioural conditions must be proportional to and address the competition concerns from 
mergers and must be logical in terms of commercial realities.516 
 
Behavioural remedies also include conditions that oblige a merged entity to develop a 
suitable compliance programme to ensure new shareholders of the acquiring firm understand 
obligations under the Competition Act.517 This succeeds acquisition of a competitor firm and in 
light of a likelihood of an inevitable increase in prices by the acquiring firm consolidating its 
position in the market and financial position.518 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
511 Nestle (Sa) (Pty) Limited/Pets Products supra 510 para 72. Allied Technologies (Pty) Ltd/NamiTech Holdings 
Limited Case No: 37/LM/Jul03 para 13-4. 
512 Nestle (Sa) (Pty) Limited/Pets Products supra note 510 para 72. 
513 Pioneer Hi-Bred/Competition Commission supra note 456 para 388. 
514 Ibid para 350. 
515 Ibid para 388. 
516 Astral Foods Limited/The Competition Commission Case No. 39/Cac/Feb04 para 32. 






Behavioural remedies are used so that post-merger; mergers will not escape ‘effective 
competition scrutiny’.519 In Business Venture Investments 790 (Pty) Ltd/Afrox Healthcare 
Limited the Tribunal imposed behavioural conditions in the form of elimination of cross holdings 
with competitors and restrictions on sale of equity.520 In this case a shelf company was formed to 
acquire all the shares in a private health care company which the Tribunal viewed as a ‘classic 
conglomerate transaction’ where a new entrant entered the private hospital market through the 
acquisition of an existing participant.521 The acquisition had horizontal and vertical concerns 
where a competitor intended to acquire holding in the target firm as a ‘passive, minority 
shareholder’ which was viewed as a ‘disingenuous attempt to shield from competition scrutiny 
the true nature of the transaction’.522 The Tribunal thought it ‘prudent to ensure that the 
competition authorities remain involved in any subsequent attempt to dispose’ of the acquiring 
firm’s assets.523  
In Clover Fonterra Ingredients (Pty) Ltd /Clover SA (Pty) Ltd and New Zealand Milk 
Products SA (Pty) Ltd, the Tribunal placed behavioural remedies in the case of likelihood 
collusion post-merger between competing firms creating a joint venture vehicle which would 
sell, distribute and market the relevant product in Sub-Saharan Africa countries.524 In this case, 
the Tribunal upheld approval of the merger transaction on condition that the joint venture vehicle 
must notify the Competition Commission and obtain approval prior to selling or distributing the 
relevant product within the Republic of South Africa.525 
5.2.3 Public interest 
Conditions placed on public interest concerns with regard to the nature of public interest 
are inclined to redistributing wealth to other recipients such as labour at the expense of 
consumers.526 An illustration is protecting jobs. In Tiger Brands Ltd/ Ashton Canning Company 
(Pty) Ltd where a merger likely to have adverse effect on employment was approved on 
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condition that the merged parties would place a moratorium on retrenchments and reduction of 
seasonal employees for a period of three years.527  The merged parties would also create a R2 
million fund to train former and retrenched employees.528 
The public interest condition must be merger specific.529 However a challenge in 
remedying public interest conditions may arise where the public interest concerned is affecting a 
sector or industry or region or SMEs. In Edgars Consolidated Stores (Pty) Ltd/Rapid Dawn  
123 (Pty) Ltd, the Tribunal declined to allow a condition to cap the purchase of imports as 
opposed to local merchandise by the merged party.530 The Tribunal held that a cap on imports on 
a single company in a sector would be an advantage to competitors.531 The concern on cheaper 
imports was held as not merger specific since cheaper imports could not be cured by imposing a 
merger condition on a single firm as the issue is ‘a sector- wide, phenomenon and must be 
addressed at that aggregated level with the appropriate instruments’.532 However, the Appeal 
Court in the Wal-Mart/Massmart case differed from this approach. In this case it was held that 
‘competition law cannot be a substitute for industrial or trade policy; hence this court cannot 
construct a holistic policy to address the challenges which are posed by globalisation. But the 
public interest concerns set out in s 12 A demands that this court gives tangible effect to the 
legislative ambition’.533 The Appeal Court addressed the public interest issue of exploitation of 
global value chains that would result in harming domestic producers.534 
 
The Appeal Court declined to impose conditions on domestic content requirements or 
import restrictions that give rise to market distortions.535 The Appeal Court rejected a proposal 
by the merging parties to create a fund worth R100 million to establish a programme aimed at 
the development of local suppliers, including SME over three years.536 The Appeal Court found 
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that the proposed condition was accepted by the Tribunal ‘without any significant considerations 
of the benefits that it might achieve’.537 
 
5.3 Remedies as tools for preserving efficiencies and social political goal of mergers in anti-
competitive mergers  
 
Remedies are an imperative the Competition Authority of Kenya can use to preserve 
efficiencies from mergers while to fixing anti-competitive issues.  The Competition Authority of 
Kenya should be more inclined to use public interest to redistribute wealth to recipients such as 
labour as opposed to merely applying rational, proportionate and enforceable conditions. The 
conditions placed on mergers are the most effective tool to ameliorating the uncertainty of public 




The Competition Act of Kenya took a big gamble in incorporating a public interest 
inquiry in its merger review. Although social and political goals are not part of the Competition 
Act of Kenya unlike South Africa, there is need for such objectives noting Kenya’s challenges 
beyond the objective of improving the welfare of the people of Kenya. Kenya needs an avenue 
for income distribution beyond its other policies. Competition law can be utilised as an effective 
tool for this. Through promoting efficiencies Kenya can benefit in the long run in promoting 
social and political goals. However, these social and political goals must be streamlined through 
a public interest inquiry in mergers. Although public interest concerns are prone to lead to 
market distortions, the Competition Authority can impose conditions on public interest 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





CHAPTER 4  
1. CONCLUSION 
Kenya has attempted to balance the pull and push factors of designing its merger laws. 
The pull factors acknowledge that competition law cannot ignore the prevailing market 
conditions for labour, barriers to trade in its economy.  These push factors have motivated Kenya 
to borrow the public interest inquiry in mergers from South Africa to reconcile economic growth 
and social and political goals in merger review. The benefit of adopting the public interest 
inquiry from South Africa is first: the opportunity to adopt ‘a long history of implementation, 
interpretation and academic discourse’ which increases legal certainty in merger review.538 
Secondly, competition law in South Africa is also premised on social and political goals. This 
allows merger review to adopt a standard beyond consumer and producer surplus and the long-
term distribution benefits of efficiencies.539 
The adoption of a standard beyond consumer and producer surplus significantly 
complicates merger review.540 This is in addition to the technical deficiency and lack of financial 
resource challenges creates a likelihood of false positive and false negative errors. Further, this 
complicated standard can be detrimental in a country that has a predominant informal sector and 
less sophisticated market participants characterised with a lack of competition culture.541 There is 
need to simplify the laws on merger review in Kenya to create certainty to market participants 
and reduce the likelihood of errors by the Competition Authority. Thankfully, the push factors 
allow Kenya to adopt legal presumptions on merger reviews from South Africa that can help in 
interpretation of competition law with social and political goals.542  
The Competition Authority has taken a further step in simplifying merger review by 
issuing guidelines on mergers and public interest. Guidelines are generally non-binding but set 
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out parameters which the Competition Authority of Kenya can exercise its discretion.543 
Guidelines are ‘invaluable to practitioners’ and draw focus to ‘genuine competition concerns’.544 
The Competition Act of Kenya was enacted as a response to both legal reform in 
competition law and economic, social and political reform in Kenya. The ERS initiated the call 
for legal reform as a result of the shortcomings in the defunct Restrictive Trade Practices Act.  
According to the ERS, the Competition Act would ‘take cognisance of the special regional and 
preferential interests of the country’.545 These preferential interests are founded on Kenya’s 
social and economic reform. Vision 2030, on the other hand, sought to reform Kenya socially 
and economically by enhancing equity and wealth creation opportunities for the poor and using 
science, technology and innovation to raise productivity and efficiency levels.546 Kenya has 
therefore tried to utilise competition law as a tool for realising long-term inclusive growth 
through the trade-off between the efficiencies and public interest concerns in mergers.  
Kenya is a factor-driven economy with agriculture, trade and wholesale as the main 
contributors to the economy. Kenya faces a number of economy challenges such as high barriers 
to trade creating unfavourable conditions for trade and access to markets and predominant 
informal trade with the potential to distort markets when analysing employment and produce 
data.547 Institutionally, Kenya is challenged by corruption from excessive discretion, budgetary 
constraints and poor human resource at the Competition Authority.548 Socially, Kenya faces high 
poverty, youth unemployment and social inequality which exclude a large majority of the 
population from actively participating in society both socially and economically.549 
It is trite that markets operating properly ‘reward efficiency and innovation, spread 
wealth and decentralize economic power’.550 However, markets must take account of the 
conditions which markets operate in developing countries such as Kenya. Competition law in 
Kenya must look beyond the economic goals of competition law and act progressively by 
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unifying the economic substance of competition law and the social and political foundations of 
the law.551 Kenya can use the promotion of competition as an efficient means of allocation of 
resources that can improve the standards of living of the population.552 Kenya must reconcile 
maximising aggregate social wealth through efficiencies, consumer welfare and social and 
political goals of merger law through the public interest inquiry in mergers.553 
The object of the Competition Act of Kenya is to ‘enhance the welfare of the people of 
Kenya by promoting and protecting effective competition in markets and preventing unfair and 
misleading market conduct throughout Kenya’.554 Promoting production efficiencies 
complement the transition stage of Kenya’s factor-driven economy. The Act is inclined towards 
a total surplus approach while the Competition Authority of Kenya prescribes to a consumer 
surplus approach. The Competition Authority of Kenya needs to balance consumer welfare with 
distributional benefits of enhancing the welfare of the people. South Africa provides a good 
analysis of this with emphasis on the correlation between the type of efficiencies and the goals of 
the Competition Act as opposed to whether efficiencies will pass to consumers.  
Conditions imposed for public interest concerns may have costs to efficiency, economic 
welfare and income distribution both within and beyond the related markets.555 There is need to 
offset efficiency benefits against costs associated with potential for government intervening in 
mergers through the public interest considerations.   
Public interest is an equity objective that is residual to both legislation and in practice 
after determining efficiencies of a merger.556 There is a likelihood of public interest being an 
inefficient tool for redistribution resulting in distortions induced by the conflict between 
beneficiaries of public interest such as small-producer welfare, labour and the goal of consumer 
welfare.557 This conflict may allow inefficient firms protection and overrule considerations of 
efficient resource allocation.558 In developing economies such as Kenya, facing socio-economic 
challenges such as poverty, high inequality, corruption, the government has delegated to 
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competition agencies a rhetorical base for resolving questions of political economy.559 There is 
need to balance the trade-off between public interest, efficiency and welfare equitable allocation 
of resources in order to produce the least amount of inefficiency.560  
The Competition Act of Kenya does not provide distributional goals unlike section 2 of 
the Competition Act of South Africa. In Kenya, the public interest inquiry in merger review 
entails determining the ‘likelihood to affect’ of a merger while in South Africa it involves 
‘whether the merger can or cannot be justified on substantial public interest grounds’.561 South 
Africa prescribes to a substantial test approach where an assessment of proportionality is applied 
to determine the weight of public interests in merger review. Kenya on the other hand applies a 
parallel test where public interest is placed at the same level as efficiencies. The parallel test in 
Kenya places less emphasis on public interest as compared to South Africa.  
The main issue arising with the parallel approach in Kenya is conflating public interest 
and efficiencies. Conflating public interest and efficiencies presumes mergers are inherently 
harmful and places the onus on merging parties to establish that the merger can be justified on 
public interest grounds. Placing the onus on merging parties this may reduce incentives of firms 
to merger which would ultimately sacrifice efficiency.562  
South Africa has utilized merger remedies as tools for first addressing the competition 
concerns of mergers. Secondly, remedies can restore the dynamic process of competition that 
would have existed if the merger did not happen.563 Thirdly, remedies can also be used to 




Kenya cannot afford to rely on the total surplus approach since it prescribes to a strict 
constructionist view where efficiencies are viewed as an end to competition at the expense of 
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protecting consumers.564 This approach ignores the challenges in the Kenyan economy and the 
objective of consumer welfare under section 3 of the Competition Act. Consumer surplus, on the 
other hand, views competition as the paramount end to wealth maximization with emphasis on 
attaining efficiencies that reverse anti-competitive behaviour. Consumer surplus does not 
advocate for the distribution goals of competition beyond efficiencies in mergers.565 Under the 
balancing weight standard, the benefit to producers from greater efficiency and redistribution 
from consumers is measured against the loss to consumers due to price increase and reduction of 
output.566 Kenya should therefore apply the balancing weight standard since it is based on the 
distribution effects of mergers and places greater weight to consumers.567 Therefore it would 
allow Kenya to maximise the distributive benefits of mergers and uphold consumer welfare 
under the objects of the Act.  
The merger review provisions under the Competition Act must be amended first to 
provide social and political goals under the Competition Act. This will first allow competition 
authorities to apply distributional goals in merger review. These distributional goals would 
complement the public interest inquiry under merger review. Distributional goals would extend 
to recipients, other than consumers and producers, such as labour, SMEs, particular industries 
and sectors and national industries to benefit from competition law. 
Second, the Competition Act should be simplified. Simplifying the provisions will allow 
certainty and permit a prescribed and clear approach that would limit discretion. Therefore 
section 46 (2) (c) should be deleted. The reference to ‘a benefit to the public which would 
outweigh any detriment’ is too wide and would subject public interest inquiry to wider 
consideration other than the listed employment, particular industrial sector or region, ability of 
SMEs to gain access or be competitive and the ability of national industries to compete in 
international markets.568  
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Thirdly, Kenya should also apply substantial test in the public interest inquiry in order to 
avoid conflating public interest and efficiencies. In order to reflect such a test, section 46 should 
be amended and separate the provisions on public interest and efficiencies under sub-section 46 
(2). The Competition Act of Kenya should separate sub-sections 46 (2) (d) to (g) on the public 
interest inquiry from 46 (2) (h) on efficiencies in order to avoid interpreting efficiencies and 
public interest on the same level.   
Fourthly, the Act should be amended to remove the words ‘likely to affect’ and reflect an 
offset or grounds for justifying a merger on both efficiencies and public interest grounds. This 
would align the Act with the interpretation by the Competition Authority in its guidelines on 
both efficiencies and public interest. The Act should be clear on whether the public interest 
inquiry will allow a merger with anti-competitive effects or efficiencies must outweigh anti-
competitive benefits.  
Lastly, the Competition Authority of Kenya must align the public interests with the 
economic, social and institutional challenges in Kenya. The provision to proposed merger likely 
affecting a particular industrial sector or region should reflect the agricultural, manufacturing, 
wholesale and retail trade which are pivotal sectors in the economy. Employment should also 
focus on the youth who form 80 per cent of the unemployed, are disadvantaged and have weak 
connection to the current employment opportunities compared to the general population.569 The 
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